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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE
VIRTUE AND INCULPATION
Kyron Huigens*
The criminal justice system assesses inculpation according to judgments about the vir
tue of the defendants. Kyron Huigens asserts that such a republican theory of the crimi
nal law stressing judgment and the good is plausible and necessary, both to explain the
defenses and to describe the broader principles of blame and punishment in criminal jus
tice. Huigens Wcates the elements of his theory in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aris
totelian virtue is a matter of sound practical judgment in the pursuit of the good. Basing
blame and punishment on virtue in this sense is legitimate because in an interdependent
society we define the good of all as we define the good for ourselves and because our best
opportunity for attaining our own good lies with a concerned involvement with the good
of others. Aristotle's definition of virtue as an indeterminate, context-sensitive faculty of
judgment explains and justifies our reliance on the jury, and defuses counter-arguments
charging peifectionism and determinism. Applying the theory to concrete issues, Huigens
demonstrates how virtue ethics establishes a compelling theoretical basis for the punish
ment of criminal negligence, inchoate offenses, and crimes of omission.

Frequently, someone who's committed pre-meditated murder, which in
Michigan is how you get life with no possibility of parole, is not a good
problem solver. They have elected to kill someone as a solution to a
problem that they've identified. But now that that person is dead, the
problem is resolved.

***

"I caught a case." It's like they went fishing and it just leaped on their
line or something. They didn't commit a crime. They don't frame it
that way. They're a victim. And it's incredible to me when you know
the kinds of crimes that some of these fellows have committed, that they
still do not see the person that they brutalized as the victim. They see
themselves as a victim.
- Pam Withrow, Warden,
Michigan State Reformatory, Ionia. 1
* A.B. summa cum laude, 1981, Washington University in St. Louis; J.D., 1984, Cornell Law
School. The author is a criminal defense attorney in Tacoma, Washington, and a former Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Pierce County, Washington. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey Chas
now 3.fld Professor Richard G. Singer for their helpful comments.
1 AU Things Considered, A Look at Teenagers Serving Life in Prison, (National Public Radio
broadcast, Jan. 4, 1994) (transcript on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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INTRODUCTION

he jails are filled with innocent people. That is, every defendant
has his reasons for acting as he did and frequently, in his own
mind, those reasons constitute a good defense. Usually, the crime itself
was not the object. There was something else the defendant was try
ing to accomplish, and the crime was committed incidentally, so to
speak, as an easy means or an unforeseen consequence. Or the de
fendant will have been "forced" to act as he did and whatever harm
was inflicted is really someone else's fault - often the victim's. The
defendant is usually wrong as a matter of law. He may even come to
see that he was wrong about having an excuse or justification. Never
theless, at the moment of action, and often for a long time afterward,
he believes in the legitimacy of his ends and the means he chose to
achieve them.
This belief is more than an example of the tenacity of self-serving
rationalization; it is also a truth about inculpation. W hat we mean
when we blame and punish, and our moral warrant for doing so, has
to do with this faulty reasoning. We blame and punish, ultimately,
because each of us reasonably demands that each of the others pursue
his chosen ends with a due regard for us - with a certain amount of
maturity, disinterestedness, and perspicacity. We blame and punish if
we find that quality of judgment lacking. It is not just harm, but the
lack of judgment that results in harm that the criminal law condemns.
That conception of inculpation, which this Article will defend at
length, takes seriously the central phenomenon of the criminal law:
that in judging a person guilty we reject his chosen ends as improper.
It is a central dogma of the liberal tradition that no such judging takes
place or ought to take place in a democratic society. Government
ought to be impartial or neutral, to the greatest extent possible, with
regard to its citizens' chosen ends. 2 The rejection of the chosen ends
of the individual in the context of the criminal law is taken to be a
necessary exception - a self-justifying means of preventing harm.3
This Article will explore a deeper logic for the rejection of ends im
plicit in inculpation. Indeed, it will challenge the assumption that the
2 See RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181, 191 (1985); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 189-90 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 254, 326-31 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY].
3 In Mill's classic formulation:
[Tl he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfer
ing with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. . . . [T]he only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized com
munity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. . . . The only part of the conduct of
any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
JOHNS. MILL, On Liberty, in 18 COLLECTED ".\'ORKS 213, 223-24 (J.M. Robson ed., 1977) (1859).
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liberal tradition, especially deontological theories of distributive justice,
has any bearing on inculpation. The theory advanced here is a repub
lican4 theory of inculpation premised on Aristotle's Nicomachean Eth
ics . 5 The law has a purpose, an end in view, which is to promote the
greater good of humanity. 6 The criminal law serves that end by pro
moting virtue; that is, by inquiring into the quality of practical judg
ment7 displayed by the accused in his actions.
4 In the course of examining republicanism from a critical perspective, Richard Fallon defines it as follows:
[NJ early all accounts of historical republicanism would encompass a few core tenets: that
human beings are essentially political animals, that they can fulfill their natures only by
participating in self-government, and that the most important aims of the political commu
nity should be to promote virtue among the citizenry and to advance the common good.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., W hat is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1695, 1697 (1989).
This Article can be seen as a part of the republican revival in legal scholarship. See generally
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 passim (1988) (discussing applica
tion of classical republican political theory to constitutional law); Stephen M. Feldman, The Per
sistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional
Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243, 2246-58

(1993) (recasting Michelman's theory of political dialogue in terms of hermeneutics); Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, r985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self Government, roo HARV.
L. REv. 4, 55-73 (1986) (outlining a republican theory of constitutional adjudication that stresses
public dialogue); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 68-87 (1985) (proposing an activist role for the judiciary to ensure legislative outcomes that
serve the public good). Several commentators question the desirability of such a revival. See, e.g.,
Emilios A. Christodoulidis, Self-Defeating Civic Republicanism, 6 RATIO JURIS 64, 84 (1993) (ar
guing that legal institutions cannot foster genuine community); Fallon, supra, at 1734-35 (doubt
ing that republicanism holds serious promise for a diverse society); Steven G. Gey, The
Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 833-98 (1993) (arguing that
republican premises in constitutional theory fail to support necessary protections of civil liberties).
5 ARISTOTLE, NrcOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
6 Gordon Wood describes the place of the greater good in the republican political thought of
Revolutionary-era America:
This common interest was not, as we might today think of it, simply the sum or consensus
of the particular interests that made up the community. It was rather an entity in itself,
prior to and distinct from the various private interests of groups and individuals. As Sa
muel Adams said in 1776, paraphrasing Vattel, the state was "a moral person, having an
interest and will of its own."
GORDON s. Woon, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 177 6-178 7, at 58 (1969) (cita
tion omitted).
7 The idea of practical judgment or practical reason is at the center of both Aristotelian
virtue ethics and republican political theory. Miriam Galston has described it well:
[M]any contemporary legal theorists with republican concerns have rejected the model of
demonstrative or syllogistic reasoning based upon universal truths in favor of some form of
contextual reasoning process. The catalyst for this development is a growing appreciation
of the importance of the particular for political discourse. This development seems to de
rive from two basic insights. First, because of their general nature, rules cannot capture
the detail, concreteness, and complexity of political life. Political and moral rules, even if
in some sense "true," are too abstract to furnish meaningful guidelines for the types of
particular decisions that make up everyday life. A wealth of considerations would have to
be added to any rule before it could be transformed into a prescription for action. Second,
since human nature and circumstances are themselves evolving, general rules describing
human affairs must be similarly evolving. As a consequence, the premises of political and
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I use the term "inculpation" advisedly, though it is rarely seen in
the literature. I do so in preference to "culpability" or "criminal re
sponsibility" in order to make clear the scope of this study. The terms
culpability and responsibility both denote an attribute of the actor.
Use of either would suggest that my subject is mens rea - a neces
sary element of proof. Although an adequate account of mens rea cer
tainly would indicate why it is a necessary element of proof, I wish to
put at the top the question of what society is about in the act of blam
ing and punishing people. The term inculpation, rather than culpabil
ity, denotes this wider focus.
Explaining inculpation by resort to Aristotle's Ethics may seem
quixotic, dilettantish, or both. I hope it is neither. As I will argue in
the next section, the criminal law cannot avoid the question of the
good - in the sense of the greater good of society or the good life for
human beings. Nor can the criminal law do without an account of
human judgment. we· understand justification as an actor's choosing
the best course of action under the circumstances. 8 But if that is our
understanding, we must be prepared to answer questions about what
the best is, and about the difference between determining it ex ante
(from the point of view of the actor) and ex post (from that of legisla
tors, judges, juries, and commentators). No less can the criminal law
do without a theory of character. We understand excuse as the actor's
not being blameworthy, though his act was wrong. 9 If that is our un
derstanding, however, we need an account of worthiness, and various
proxies proposed for character in explaining worthiness - especially
voluntariness - are plainly inadequate. 10
I have taken Aristotle's Ethics as the premise for this theory of
inculpation because the Ethics offers an integrated account of the
good, human judgment, and human character. As the third section of
this Article will make clear, Aristotle's understanding of virtue is a
rich alternative to the prevailing, simplistic sense of virtue as conform
ity to a moral code. Aristotle's virtue is a matter of mature, perspica
cious practical judgment. Virtue cannot be reduced to a definite rule.
It requires a capacity to respond to the infinite challenges of practical
life with a regard for the good - not as a monolithic constraint, but
moral reasoning cannot be known deductively or theoretically, but must be acquired as
part of the practical reasoning process.
Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral
Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 331, 371 (1994) (citations omitted); see
also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Practical Syllogisms and Practical Science, in ARISTOTLE'S .DE
Moro AN,MALillM 165, 210-20 (1978) (giving a detailed account of the practical syllogism as the
basis of Aristotle's ethics); cf RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 2-3 (1983) (explaining
practical judgment in similar terms in the development of a comprehensive hermeneutic political
theory).
8 See infra pp. 1429-30.
9 See infra p. 1440.
10 See infra pp. 1445-46.
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as a term in an ongoing practical dialectic. Such an account of virtue
makes it possible to respond to the issues of the good, practical judg
ment, and character as they inevitably arise in the explication of incul
pation, with a due regard for modern concerns about perfectionism. 1 1
The fourth section o f this Article will address the grounds of incul
pation as a judgment on virtue; the meaning of that phrase in terms of
the actual trial of a criminal case; the Aristotelian response to the
charge of perfectionism; and the answer to what I call the determin
ist's defense. The latter - the contention that criminal responsibility
is impossible to assess due to the deep, longstanding, and well-known
causes of criminal behavior - arises with particular force in an Aris
totelian theory of criminal law.
The fifth section of this Article will consider the effects of my the
ory on the borders of inculpation. One question is whether criminal
negligence is inculpatory or merely strict liability in disguise. The an
swer offered here is that negligence is genuinely inculpating. I next
consider the other border of inculpation, inchoate offenses, and argue
that an ethics of virtue is clearly discernible in the leading rationale
for punishing attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies. Punishing a
disposition to do harm involves by definition a judgment on virtue.
Finally, I consider the problem of omissions. I argue that the Bad
Samaritan who refuses to aid another in distress may be culpable re
gardless of our ability to find a duty to rescue. The virtue ethics on
which my theory is based obviates the need to identify a discrete duty
with which to transmute the omission into an inculpating "act."
As that last paragraph suggests, there is a prescriptive strain to
some of the arguments that follow. On the whole, I believe my theory
to be descriptive of the criminal law as it stands. This Article is an
attempt to articulate the justifying subtext of the particular practices
and rules of the criminal law. 1 2 While working on a foundation, how11 In general, perfectionism is a limitation on the political principle of equality, in the service
of human excellence, whether in virtue, art, science, or philosophy. As Rawls describes it: "[T]he
greater happiness of the less fortunate does not in general justify curtailing the expenditures re
quired to preserve cultural values. These forms of life have greater intrinsic worth than the lesser
pleasures, however widely the latter are enjoyed." RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, at 326 (cita
tions omitted).
The charge of perfectionism is one that the republican revivalists have moved promptly to
meet. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988) ("I will contend, to
the contrary, that republican constitutional thought is not indissolubly tied to any such static,
parochial, or coercive communitarianism . . . .'�; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revi
val, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988) ("This version of republicanism, I argue, is not antiliberal at
all; it incorporates central features of the liberal tradition.'').
12 It might be argued that I do not adhere to H.L.A. Hart's scheme of three levels of analysis
in the criminal law. See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUN
ISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW l, 3-13 (1968). Hart distin
guishes between defining punishment, justifying the general practice of punishment, and
determining who may be punished by how much. He calls these three levels of analysis Defini
tion, General Justifying Aim, and Distribution. See id. at 3-4. My argument violates Hart's
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ever, one cannot help but notice whether the structure resting on it is
square and secure. The prescriptive elements of my argument are on
that order: changes in practice or doctrine that might be made to
square the law with its foundations, but not a comprehensive program
of legal reform.

II.

THE NEED F OR AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF lNCULPATION

This Article is about inculpation: the justification of the punishing
majority rather than of the innocent accused. Nevertheless, one can
not avoid discussion of the defenses. Not only is there a substantial
body of excellent scholarship on excuse and justification, 13 but also the
defenses are conceptually inseparable from inculpation. My specific
widely accepted scheme in that it employs a single ethical theory to explain both who is punished
and why we have punishment at all. I am not troubled by that violation.
First, Hart's conceptual borders are not as impermeable as some assume. Hart argues that
our theory at one level does not have any necessary implications for our understanding of another
level. Hart does not argue that our theory at one level can have no implications for our under
standing on another. On the contrary, he suggests just the opposite. See id. at 9 ("[O)f course
Retribution in General Aim entails retribution in Distribution.'')
Second, Hart's argument must be seen as part of a defense of utilitariani5m. One argument
against utilitarianism as a theory of punishment is that general utility would be served by the
deterrent effect of punishing people selected at random so long as it were publicly assumed or
claimed that the punishment was for crimes. A utilitarian theory of the criminal law, in other
words, does not entail individualized punishment or any notion of desert. Hart's objective in the
Prolegomenon is to respond to that criticism by malting room in a utilitarian theory for individu
alized punishment:
Much confusing shadow-fighting between utilitarians and their opponents may be avoided
if it is recognized that it is perfectly consistent to assert both that the General Justifying
Aim of the practice of punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of
this General Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference to principles of Distri
bution which require that punishment should be only of an offender for an offence.
Id. Thus Hart's limited point - that one's theory at one level has no necessary implications at
another - has a limited purpose: to answer an objection to utilitarianism.
That being the case, I feel no strong compulsion to observe Hart's distinctions here. My the
ory is not a utilitarian theory and, whatever other defects it may have, it is able to account for
individualized punishment.
1 3 See Joshua Dressler, Foreword - Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Con
cepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REv. u55, u 5 7--60 (x987) (reviewing recent scholarship
and basic concepts). George Fletcher is widely credited with reviving interest in excuse and justi
fication as a result of his efforts to bring Continental legal thinking to bear on the Anglo-Ameri
can system. See id. at u59. As Fletcher describes it, the distinction between excuse and
justification is clearer in other systems of criminal law because they distinguish between two
levels of analysis in criminal liability: the level of wrongdoing, at which the prohibitions of the
criminal law correlate with society's norms of behavior; and the level of attribution, at which the
question of the fairness of blaming and punishing the particular wrongdoer arises. See GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6, at 454-58 (x978); see also George P. Fletcher,
The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REv. 949, 95 x-53 (x985) (describing "structural" legal
discourse, of which this would be an example, in contrast to the "flat" legal discourse of the
common law, with its emphasis on reasonableness as a single-stage inquiry). Justification is a
question that arises at the level of wrongdoing: a criminal actor whose act appears to violate the
prohibitory norm is justified if the act falls within an exception to the norm or a countervailing
norm. Excuse is a question which arises at the level of attribution: a criminal actor is excused if,
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concern in this section is to demonstrate that we cannot think clearly
about excuse and justification - or about inculpation - without also
thinking about three other issues: the good, practical judgment, and
character.
A.

Justification and the Good

Let us take up justification first. 14 Both George Fletcher and Paul
Robinson understand justification as a balancing of competing inter
ests. 1 5 Robinson takes the defense of lesser evils as the paradigm of
justification. 16 One who sets fire to a field in order to create a fire
break, thereby saving a town from an approaching forest fire, is ac
quitted of arson on the ground that he avoided a greater harm than he
inflicted. Similarly, one who defends against aggression with deadly
force is acquitted on the ground that the harm inflicted by the defend
ant in self-defense is less than the harm threatened by the victim. In
the case of self-defense, however, the law requires only that the force
used be proportional to the threat, not that it actually outweigh the

upon reflection, we find that it would not be fair to blame and punish him for the act, despite the
fact that it is and remains wrongful. See FLETCHER, supra, § 6.6.r, at 459.
Because of these differing rationales, excuse and justification differ in their implications and
applications. Foremost among these is the fact that justification can be universalized whereas
excuse cannot. See id. § 10.1.1, at 761-62. For example, a third party may assist a justified actor
in the "wrongful" act, but a third party may not assist one who is merely excused. The right to
resist also distinguishes excuse and justification. One is entitled to resist an excused actor, be
cause her act remains wrongful. If one resists a justified actor, however, one would be violating
the norm that justifies her tiehavior. See id. at 760; see also Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law
Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 199, 203 (1982) (identifying five categories of
criminal law defenses: justification, excuse, failure of proof, offense modification, and
nonexculpatory public policy). But see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification
and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897, 1898 (1984) (challenging Fletcher's claims that a more
rigorous distinction between the defenses is either possible or desirable).
14 Joshua Dressler writes that a justification "negates the social harm of an offense." Dressler,
supra note 13, at u 6r. That definition is inadequate. The language is obviously figurative - the
actual harm remains. One cannot simply negate the injury or death of a person, nor the destruc
tion of property, but the difference between "social harm" and actual harm is unclear. Dressler
cites Albin Eser's definition of "social harm" as the "negation, endangering, or destruction of an
individual, group[] or state interest which was deemed socially valuable." Id. at n61 n.21 (quot
ing Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the
Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DuQ. L. REv. 345, 413 (1965)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in Dressler). This definition, however, seems too strong. It is not accurate to
say that a justified homicide involves the destruction of an individual who was once deemed
socially valuable but who now, due to the circumstances of her destruction, is not. To say, as
Dressler does, see id. at u61 & n.22, that the harm is tolerable from society's point of view is not
to say that the harm is negated but that the interest harmed by the facially criminal act is out
weighed by some other interest.
15 See FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 10.1.3, at 769; Robinson, supra note 13, at 213.
1 6 "This type of justification defense, though the least common in American criminal codes,
most clearly reflects the general principle of justification defenses." Robinson, supra note 13, at
214.
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threatened harm. 1 7 The interests of the defender are said to outweigh
those of the aggressor in a theoretical context only because we include
the general interest in a peaceable society among those on the de
fender's side. 18 In a third category of justification - public authority
- the general interests of society make up the entire weight on the
prevailing side. The police officer with probable cause or a warrant
may make an arrest regardless of any actual threat to himself, and the
liberty interest of the arrestee is outweighed by society's interest in a
law-abiding citizenry and in law-enforcement generally. 19
So stated, one difficulty with the balance-of-interests theory of jus
tification is obvious: general social interests in peace, a law-abiding
citizenry, and so on function as makeweights. If a balancing of inter
ests is not to be arbitrary or result-oriented, we need a reliable scale of
value, neutral as between the interests, upon which they can be com
pared. This objection might be taken to mean that no such neutral
scale exists - from which it would follow, supposedly, that the inter
est-balancing theory of justification is insupportable. That is not my
argument. In fact, as later sections will make clear, 20 nothing could be
farther from my intentions.
My point is rather that the theory of justification as a balancing of
interests requires a supporting theory of the good. It requires a theory
of the final ends of political association in which those ends are taken
to be something apart from the particular ends of society's members.
Without some such conception of the greater good of society, the bal
ance-of-interests theory of justification is incoherent. Without some
comprehensive background of value, common to both interests and
within which each can be given its full due, the choice between inter
ests might be nothing more than an arbitrary preference for one of
two incommensurable concerns.
Despite the widespread acceptance of the balancing theory of justi
fication, this particular aspect of the theory remains largely unrecog
nized and unexamined. The paradigm case of lesser evils is usually
framed so as to render the scales of value problem unproblematic.
1 7 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2Xb) (1985) ("The use of deadly force is not justifiable
under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat . . . .");
see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7(b),
at 651-53 (1986) ("In determining how much force one may use in self-defense, the law recognizes
that the amount of force which he may justifiably use must be reasonably related to the
threatened harm which he seeks to avoid.'').
18 Fletcher frames the dominant Anglo-American view as a discounting of the aggressor's in
terests. "The underlying premise is that if someone culpably endangers the interests of another,
his interests are less worthy of protection.'' FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 10.5.2, at 858. I take this
argument as another way of saying that the social interest in peaceable society weighs in on the
side of the victim of the initial aggressor.
1 9 See Robinson, supra note 13, at 215-16.
20 See infra Part IV.A.
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The hypothetical is usually one like the fire-break case, in which the
interests at stake are primarily economic. Either the two competing
interests are both economic and therefore comparable on a simple
scale of dollars - the value of the crops in a field versus the value of
the homes, businesses, and infrastructure of the town - or one com
peting interest is economic and the other is the sort of interest that is
generally and uncontroversially accepted as paramount - the value of
the crops in a field versus the value of the lives in the town.
If one accepts the idea that all human activity is ultimately reduc
ible to economic terms, this framing does not pose a problem. That
that assumption is widely shared may, perhaps, account for the uncrit
ical acceptance of interest-balancing as an adequate explanation for
justification. If, however, one takes a more exacting approach to the
problem of the good, then justification and its converse, inculpation,
require considerably more philosophical support.
The problem of the good in explaining justification cannot be
avoided simply by abjuring the interest-balancing theory. Alternative
explanations of justification eventually run up against the same prob
lem. For example, Sanford Kadish has advanced a theory of self-de
fense, in which he purports to derive a liberty to kill from a right
against the state. 2 1 Among the rights we do not surrender in the social
contract, he argues, is the right to resist aggression. Consequently, we
have not ceded to the state the power to punish us for so resisting. 22
Several problems with this theory come to mind. 23 Most significant
for our purposes is the fact that it cannot extend beyond the core case
2! See Sanford H. Krulish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64
CAL. L. REV. 87I, 884-86 (1976) (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33
(1974)). Kadish rejects interest-balancing as an explanation for self-defense - a much more sig
nificant category of justification than lesser evils - for a number of cogent reasons. The fore
most is that the balancing test conflicts with a considered judgment that all Jives are of equal
value. That principle leaves us no basis for choosing between the life of the initial aggressor and
that of the defendant, and renders the entire balancing enterprise suspect from the start. See id.
at 882.
The balancing theory also fails to account for the justification of deadly force in cases in
which life is not threatened, for example in the defense of property following an unlawful entry.
We cannot dispense with our prevailing judgment that lives should be valued over property by
gesturing toward the supposed sanctity of the dwelling, which in any event could function only as
a makeweight in a balancing analysis. The balancing theory also implies (falsely) that one person
attacked by twenty should submit rather than attempt to destroy them all. Finally, the rule seems
to justify the killing of innocent aggressors, such as a child or an incompetent person. See id.
22 See id. at 885-86.
23 First, it relies on a simplistic account of the social contract. How does Krulish know that
we have not surrendered the right to defend against aggression? He suggests that it simply stands
to reason that we would retain it, because we would be worse off if we surrendered it. See id. at
884-85. As Rawls demonstrates, however, the social contract theory requires considerably more
elaboration before we can even approach a clear idea of what kind of institutions would arise
from an original position. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2 , § 3, at I I-17 .
Second, Kadish's theory merely restates the problem. To say a right or liberty i s reserved vis
a-vis the state tells us nothing about the nature of the right or liberty other than to claim for it
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of defending against a clear threat to one's life. The right to self-pres
ervation does not account for my right to respond with deadly force
when I am not necessarily threatened with death - in a case of kid
napping or rape,24 for example, or when I can safely retreat. 25 Nor
can self-preservation account for the right to use deadly force when
property rights are threatened, as in those jurisdictions which permit
the use of deadly force against one who is about to commit a crime
other than assault after an unlawful entry onto premises. 2 6 For these
cases, Kadish expands the right of self-preservation to include a right
of personal autonomy: 27 I need not retreat from my residence, and can
defend it and the property it contains, because my property is an "in
terest[ ] closely identified" with my person. 2 8 The right to preserve
one's life becomes a right to preserve "the personality of the victim" of
the aggressor. 2 9 Because the right to defend against lesser threats and
the right to defend property are limited rights, Kadish posits "propor
tionality" as a separate, countervailing principle to the expanded right
of self-defense. 30
At this point, we reach the same sort of objections I have lodged
against the theory of balancing interests. What is the scope of per
sonal autonomy? What is the scale of proportionality? My right to
personal autonomy presumably extends to liberty of movement and
bodily integrity: use of force in defending against kidnapping and rape
can be accounted for without much controversy along the autonomy
axis. But how far personal autonomy extends outward from the per
son to places and things, and on what grounds, is far from clear.
Along the proportionality axis, no strong consensus appears in any
class of cases: not all jurisdictions recognize a right to use deadly force
in rape and kidnapping situations, not to mention the protection of
the status of a natural right. Such a claim raises its own set of questions and objections. Beyond
a brief reference to Nozick, to which we will return in a moment, Kadish does not address those
issues. See Kadish, supra note 2 r, at 885 n.23 .
Kadish's theory also fails to account for one of the principal features of self-defense and justi
fication generally: the right of third parties to intervene. See FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 10.1, at
7 6 1-62 . How can my right to self-preservation provide grounds for a third person to kill my
aggressor? Kadish notes the problem but argues only that my right would be infringed upon were
the state to take away the right of third parties to assist me. See Kadish, supra note 2 1, at
885-86. This assertion at best restates and at worst adds to the problem. What right would the
state infringe upon, and how do we know it is so extensive?
24 See, e.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704(2)(c) (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 7 76.012
(West 1992); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (Baldwin 1990).
2 5 See, e.g. , Johnson v. State, 315 S.E.2d 871, 872-73 (Ga. 1984); Haynes v. State, 451 So. 2d
2 2 7, 229 (Miss. 1984); Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 240 (Nev. 1990).
26 See, e.g. , ALA. CODE § 13A-3 -25(b)(2) (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 26 -903(2) (Harrison 1 988);
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 703-306(3) (1994).
2 1 See Kadish, supra note 2 1, at 886.
28 Id.
2 9 Id.

at 888.
30 See id. at 886.
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property, and those that do allow deadly force do so in a varying
range of circumstances.3 1
Once again, the inference I would draw from the lack of consensus
is not that it renders Kadish's scheme of autonomy versus proportion
ality untenable; my point is rather that, as with the scale upon which
competing interests are to be weighed, some comprehensive system of
value must exist within which to judge the scope of personal auton
omy and the degrees of proportionality. Without some common, un
derlying standard, our resolutions of conflicts between autonomy and
proportionality in particular cases will be arbitrary.
This problem of standards in the analysis of justification involves
us in issues of the greater good of society or of the distinctive good of
human beings. Only by reference to a conception of the good, broadly
conceived, can we make the judgments of weight and degree involved
in justification. That is by no means the prevailing view. On the con
trary, to the extent that the problem of standards is recognized, the
assumption seems to be that the standards can be supplied by the
leading deontological theories of justice. 32
Kadish's analysis of self-defense rests quite explicitly on a deonto
logical theory of justice. The question of justification, for Kadish, is a
problem of each person's relation to the state. 33 He begins with the
assumption that there is no end or purpose of social organization that
is distinct from the ends of the individuals involved. He cites Nozick
3 1 Although the Model Penal Code authorizes the use of deadly force to ward off "death,
serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat," MODEL PE
NAL CODE § 3.04 ( 1985), the New Jersey statute otherwise adopting the Model Penal Code provi
sion refers only to "death or serious bodily harm," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2) (West Supp.
1 99 4). Minnesota authorizes deadly force only to resist "great bodily harm or death," MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.065 (West 1 987), an express change from prior law which allowed it in response
to the commission of a felony generally, see id. cmt. at 72.
32 Deontological political theories, in accord with their Kantian roots, subordinate 1:he good to
the right. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, § 6, at 31 & n.16; David A.J. Richards, Kantian
Ethics and the Harm Principle: A Reply to John Finnis, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 464 (1 987).
That is, they reject the notion of an overriding societal good or a comprehensive conception of the
good life as an organizing principle of society on the ground that it would violate the precept that
others should be treated as ends in themselves rather than as means. See IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (Lewis w. Beck trans., 1 9 5 9 ). To devote
society to a single conception of the good would be to use individuals as instruments toward that
end. Consequently, deontological theory begins with the assumption that the individual members
of society simply have the ends they have and stresses the priority of the right: the question of the
fair terms of social cooperation. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 1 9 1-92. To minimize the ques
tion of the good, however, is not to eliminate it. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, § 60, at
395-99 .
33 Kadish writes:
The individual does not surrender his fundamental freedom to preserve himself against
aggression by the establishment of state authority; this freedom is required by most theo
ries of state legitimacy, whether Hobbesian, Lockeian or Rawlsian, according to which the
individual's surrender of prerogative to the state yields a quid pro quo of greater, not
lesser, protection against aggression than he had before.
Kadish, supra note 21, at 885.
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for the concept of side constraints34 - a key concept in Nozick's the
ory of limited government35 - and he cites Kant, by way of Nozick,
for the proposition that the principal side constraint on individual and
state action is the categorical imperative. 36 For Kadish, the question
of justification, like all questions of justice, is a matter of the fair
terms of social cooperation - a question of the right, not the good.
Fletcher seems to share that assumption in his analysis of lesser
evils. He is at pains to distinguish the theory of justification as inter
est-balancing from utilitarianism and from teleological theories gener
ally. 37 His analysis is drawn from German law, and he is quite clear
that the German concept of Recht stands as an absolute side con
straint on utility maximization or the choice of the greater good. 38 He
has elsewhere likened the concept of Recht to Rawls's first principle of
justice,39 and stressed its Kantian definition as "the set of conditions
under which the choices of each person can be reconciled with the
choices of others, under universal laws of freedom."4° For Fletcher
too, justification is a question of the right, not the good.
Treating justification as a matter of deontological justice seems
plausible initially. The net effect of rules about self-defense, defense of
others, lesser evils, and necessity is to establish fair terms of social
cooperation. The rules define spheres of autonomy that must be
respected and the conditions under which and limits within which
people can invade and interfere with one another's interests. From
this perspective, the rules governing the various justifications function
like any other social institution. Consequently, it makes sense to assert
that, like any other social institution, justification should be set up so
that it leads to an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty com
patible with a similar liberty for others, or so that it constitutes a set
34 See id. at 885 n.23.
35 Nozick's concept of a side constraint is perhaps the one feature of his theory that most
clearly marks it as a deontological theory of justice. Nozick introduces the concept for the precise
purpose of distinguishing his approach at a fundamental level from teleological theories of politics
and the state - what he calls "an end-state maximizing view." ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974). He needs the concept to explain why a state that takes Kant's
categorical imperative seriously would not make the imperative itself the end or purpose of social
organization. A state which is minimal because it is organized around the principle that one
person should not be used as a means for others' ends could quickly become a maximal state if it
set out actively to prevent its members from treating each other in that way. See id. at 27-29.
Nozick therefore limits the role of the categorical imperative to that of a side constraint on gov
ernmental action as opposed to the end of governmental action.
3 6 See Kadish, supra note 21, at 885 n.24 (citing NOZICK, supra note 35, at 34, and IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35-36 (J. Ladd trans., 1965)).
37 See FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 10.2, at 774-98.
38 See id. at 780-88.
39 See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 966 & n.77 (citing RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, § I I , at
60, for the proposition that "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others").
4o Id. at 965.
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of conditions under which the choices of each person can be reconciled
with the choices of others under universal laws of freedom.
One may well ask, however, whether that perspective, perhaps best
characterized as the legislator's perspective, is the proper one for ana
lyzing justification. To view justification as a system of social coopera
tion is to stress its role in the criminal law's system of deterrence. The
pattern of successful and failed assertions of necessity or self-defense is
what defines the boundaries of autonomy and the weight of contend
ing interests for the rest of us. We understand that we cross these
lines at our peril. But to make the deterrent function the main focus
of our analysis of justification raises at least three problems.
First, the deterrent function for society at large is a secondary ef
fect of individual cases, and to make a secondary effect the centerpiece
of our analysis of justification is counterintuitive. In actual cases of
justification, we do not set out to arrange the terms of fair cooperation
in the society. The trial turns on the particulars of the case itself: the
nature of the particular threat presented and the appropriateness of
the particular response. General social and institutional considerations
are represented in the law and in the instructions to the jury. But that
law is either the accretion of past individual cases or the product of
separate, ordinary legislation in which the legislature, for the most
part, has tried to encapsulate the logic of prior cases.4 1 At trial, the
object is to render justice to the individual, not to legislate. Analyses
of justification premised on deontological theories of justice, however,
stress the secondary, legislative function almost to the exclusion of in
dividual justice.
That exclusion points to the second difficulty with analyzing justi
fication as a matter of deontological justice: stressing the deterrent
function of individual cases is inconsistent with the categorical impera
tive that undergirds deontological justice. Rawls and Nozick derive
the central premise of their theories from Kant's dictum that we are to
treat others not as means, but as ends in themselves.42 Those devoted
41 "To the extent that common law offenses have rested on desirable definitions, these defini
tions have been incorporated into the Code; where clarification or modification of the common
law definitions was thought necessary, this was effected by the Code formulations." MODEL PE
NAL CODE § 1 .05 cmt. 2 (1985).
42 See NOZICK, supra note 35, at 32; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, § 40, at 251-57; cf John
Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980, 77 J. PHIL. 5 15,
518-19 (1980) (distinguishing his method of argument from Kant's). The basis of the categorical
imperative is Kant's conception of the person as autonomous:
The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily
thinks of his own existence in this way; thus far it is a subjective principle of human
actions. Also every other rational being thinks of his existence by means of the same ra
tional ground which holds also for myself; thus it is at the same time an objective principle
from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the
will. The practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only.
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to that principle as strongly as Fletcher and Kadish seem to be should
hesitate to premise their analyses on the feature of the criminal law
that comes closest to violating it. Their treatments of justification as a
social institution, however, give the law's deterrent function primary
place. Deterrence, at bottom, is a matter of making an example of the
defendant, and to make an example of someone is to treat him as a
means rather than as an end. In this light, an analysis of justification
as a matter of deontological justice is at cross-purposes, if not actually
self-contradicting.
Finally, if one does shift the focus from the operation of justifica
tion as a social institution to its operation in the individual case, one
recognizes that the concept of the good plays a different role in the
theory of justification than it does in deontological theories of justice.43
Deontological theories are theories of distributive justice: the question
is how the goods of the earth and society are to be shared. The sub
ject is social cooperation. Both Nozick and Rawls frame the problem
in terms of social contract, and their point of view is the hypothetical
beginning of society. 44 In seeking a fair arrangement of society, the
first step such theories take is to defer the question of the good. Given
that a single comprehensive moral doctrine is not a fair basis of social
organization for a democratic society, deontological theories begin with
the assumption that people are entitled to the ends that they have.45
From there, the question is the optimal conditions under which each
person seeks his or her own good.46
In the matter of justification, in contrast, we do not have the lux
ury of deferring the question of the good. We are not concerned with
distributing goods at society's beginning or with cooperation; we are
concerned with the active pursuit of goods by real people in an ongo
ing social arrangement. In a case of justification, we begin with a
certain, known conflict. Furthermore, whatever particular form the
conflict takes, it is at bottom a conflict between schemes of ends: be
tween that of the criminal actor and that of another person; or be
tween that of the criminal actor and that of society as expressed in its
KANT, supra note 3 2 ,
43 One can never

at 47 (footnote omitted).
dispense entirely with the question of the good, even in a deontological
theory. Rawls acknowledges that unless we take rationality as a good and posit an index of
primary goods - those basic things that all people want, whatever else they want - there is
nothing to drive his theory. The members choose the basic arrangements of their society from
behind a veil of ignorance as to their particular circumstances, but there must be some "thin
theory of the good" on which they base even those elementary choices. RAWLS, THEORY, supra
note 2 , § 60, at 396. In any analysis of social institutions, then, the question of the good must
arise; the issue is what role it plays in the analysis.
44 See NOZICK, supra note 35, at 3-9; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, § 3, at 1 2 .
4 5 This is not to say that a theory such as Rawls's puts n o limits o n what are acceptable ends,
but only that people are to choose within the broadest possible range and any limits are deter
mined by something other than a conception of the greater good.
46 See NOZICK, supra note 35, at 149-50; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2 , § 6, at 28-29.
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legislation. When the accused is found guilty, the decision in a crimi
nal case is to prefer one set of ends over the other. 47 When the de
fense is justification, that question of ends is posed most starkly; but it
is present in some form in every criminal case. In a criminal case, in
other words, the neutrality toward individuals' schemes of ends to
which deontological theory aspires is simply impossible.
In this sense the analysis of justification necessarily leads us to
questions of the good. Schemes of ends are determined by the per
son's, or the legislature's, conception of the good - what is worth
pursuing and in what order. The relative priority of competing
schemes of ends is necessarily determined in the disposition of actual
cases, and one cannot understand what is happening without directly
taking up the question of the good. Deontological theories of distribu
tive justice simply address the wrong questions if one is seeking an
understanding of justification.
B.

Inculpation and Instrumentalism

At this point, we must turn the usual question around, and view
these issues as a matter of inculpation rather than as a matter of (ex
culpating) justification. If the line of reasoning I have been pursuing
is correct, the question of the good arises at some point in any crimi
nal case and not just in cases of justification. In cases of a colorable
defense the controversy becomes overt, but even in an easy case - a
confessed, premeditated homicide, say - the suspect has acted in ac
cord with her scheme of ends, however obviously perverse it may be,
and our finding her culpable entails a rejection of that scheme. The
question then becomes: what is the rationale of that rejection? Given
that the decision in every case entails an assessment of the defendant's
scheme of ends and her conception of the good, what constitutes that
assessment?
The short answer is that inculpation, as an inquiry into a person's
relation to and responsibility for the greater good, is an inquiry into
the person's character - more particularly into the soundness, matur4 7 Stuart Hampshire draws a distinction, along these lines, between justice and liberty as
political ideals. He does so in the course of commenting on the ascendancy of the latter in mod
ern political philosophy, most conspicuously in the work of Rawls. Rawls is concerned with pre
serving liberty in a scheme of distributive justice. Justice itself, including justice in the criminal
law, is a different matter:
Liberty, like happiness and the pursuit of happiness, is a positive ideal, while justice is a
negative ideal. To recommend practices and institutions in proportion as they remove bar
riers to the freedom of individuals is to aim at a positive good. The aim is one of enlight
ened improvement in harmony with those human desires which can be assumed to be
almost universal. We think of justice as a restraint upon those desires: the desire for a
greater share of rewards, the desire for dominance. . . . When justice needs to be enforced
and is enforced, the scene is not one of harmony; some ambitions are frustrated. A barrier
is erected, an impossibility declared.

STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 7I-72 (1989).
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ity, and breadth of her practical judgment, the faculty by which she
assembles her conception of the good and her scheme of ends. If we
take virtue to be, at bottom, this sort of exemplary practical judgment,
then inculpation is a judgment on virtue.
Understanding inculpation as an assessment of virtue requires a
fundamental shift in perspective. We must begin to consider the ques
tion at the level of individual justice and case adjudication. We must
stop treating inculpation as a matter of distributive justice and surren
der the society-wide perspective of the legislator.
From the perspective of the legislator or the legal theorist, persons
are causes of harm and nothing else. W hen considering a rule, the
legislator holds people's choices and motivations constant; that is, the
hypothetical conditions into which a proposed rule is introduced in
clude human beings who will react in uniform and predictable ways
or whose reactions can be meaningfully aggregated. Variations in indi
viduals' assessments of their circumstances and in their fears, interests,
strengths, motivations, aspirations, desires, failings, and every other as
pect of character are set aside.
This instrumental style of reasoning has profound implications for
our understanding of the law. Because it pushes questions of individ
ual character and motivation into the background and holds them
constant, it precludes a role for the criminal actor's deliberations,
choices, and ends - in short, her practical judgment - in our under
standing of the defenses and inculpation. It blocks an adjudication
level perspective and contributes to the misguided tendency to treat
inculpation and the defenses as a branch of distributive justice.
The particular ways in which the legislator's perspective distorts
our understanding of the defenses point directly to practical judgment
as a preferable focus or starting point for the analysis of inculpation. I
have already alluded to one such distortion. Instrumental explanations
require us to view the person as a cause of harm and nothing more.
We do not view her as a full moral agent, with her own scheme of
ends, her own talents and abilities, her own strengths of character, and
so on. This view runs counter to our post-Kantian convictions about
the proper regard for persons: treating a person as an end in herself
would require taking her individuality into account rather than treat
ing her as a uniform cog in a social mechanism. We can respond to an
objection along these lines by imposing a side constraint based on the
categorical imperative, in order to ensure that we do in the end main
tain a proper regard for individuals. 48 But would it not be preferable
to have an understanding of inculpation that did not lead to implica
tions in need of a side constraint? Would it not be simpler and wiser
just to take real individuals' conceptions of the good and schemes of
ends as our starting point?
48

See, e.g., Kaciish, supra note

21,

at 889.
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There is also reason to doubt the explanatory power of instrumen
tal theories in this area. Is it really plausible to say that the law on
the defenses serves to deter harm? Consider carefully the sort of cases
we are dealing with here. Cases of excuse and justification both in
volve consideration of the defendant's circumstances: of an external
threat or constraint that in some sense either necessitates her action
(justification) or makes it not her own (excuse). In either case we are
dealing not with a person who sets out to do harm, but with one who
does harm in response to her immediate circumstances. In some cases
of colorable defense the actor has the opportunity to assess the conse
quences to herself of various courses of action, but more often her ac
tion will be a spontaneous, relatively unconscious reaction. To the
extent it relies on conscious, contemporaneous, instrumental reasoning
on the part of the actor, an account of the defenses becomes implausi
ble. In such cases, systems of deterrence and motivation do not oper
ate except insofar as they have been so deeply ingrained as to become
part of the actor's very character. Would it not make sense, then, to
approach the question from the point of view of character rather than
of deterrence? Is not the focus of our concern better described as the
judgment of the actor? Are we not asking whether she has made the
right choices in her particular situation - choices which, given the
exigent circumstances, spring directly from her deepest preferences and
priorities?
Finally, instrumentalism also falls victim to the danger of mistak
ing the metaphor for the thing itself. By this I mean that the rules
and standards of the analysis are and should remain heuristic devices:
they do not actually serve a public, prescriptive role. Having arrived
at a rule, we ought to return our attention to the individual case it is
supposed to explain. That last step, however, is most often omitted.
We forget that the defenses are legislated only in bare outline, and that
our true object of study is the actual, individualized adjudication of a
person by a jury. The point of decision we are trying to explain in
volves no one with the god-like perspective of a legislator; there are
only twelve people judging another person, or, if you prefer, another
person's act.49
What is at issue in the trial is the pattern of individual choices that
led to the act and hence to the harm. The factfinder, in deciding the
case, will accept or reject the decision the actor made in the circum
stances she faced; and in doing so, will pass judgment, ultimately, on
the practical reasoning of that actor. The jurors will accept or reject
the particular conception of the good and the scheme of ends that led
the actor into the conflict and to the resulting harm. In order to ana49 I am holding constant here certain real but exogenous influences on jury outcomes, such as
race and ethnicity. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1986) (holding unconstitutional
the use of peremptory challenges to affect the racial balance of a jury).
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lyze justification properly, we ought to view the matter from the same
perspective. We ought to concern ourselves with the rendering of indi
vidual justice - the resolution of actual cases - rather than with the
logic of imaginary legislators pursuing the optimal conditions of social
cooperation.
W hat we need in order to understand inculpation is not a rule that
will embrace the greatest number of cases. Rather, we need to know
how an assessment of the actor's practical judgment can result m
blame and punishment that are widely accepted as legitimate.
C. Excuse, Practical Judgment, and Character
Despite the well-charted doctrinal differences that separate excuse
from justification,50 an analysis of the principal controversy in the the
ory of excuse can help us answer the question posed above. What we
mean by "culpable" action - be it non-excused or non-justified - is
that it evinces poor judgment in conceiving and pursuing the good: an
absence of virtue. Our difficulties in the theory of excuse are attribu
table to our reluctance to acknowledge that inculpation is a matter of
assessing character in that sense.
The principal difficulty in the theory of excuse is the incursion of
what I will call the determinist's defense. We take it as a given that a
person should not be punished for an act, however wrong it might be,
if she could not have acted otherwise. We therefore excuse wrongdo
ing rather than justify it when we cannot fairly attribute the wrongdo
ing to the defendant. 5 1 It must be noted, however, that in principle
this defense has no limit. 5 2 Seen in retrospect, none of our actions are
freely determined by ourselves. None of us is a god-like unmoved
mover. Each person is the product of a specific history that not only
has placed her in the circumstances of the alleged crime, but also has
shaped the character from which her choices in those circumstances
will emerge. In a genuine sense, then, any criminal actor can be said
to have been unable to act otherwise in committing her crime. 53
50 See FLETCHER, supra note 13, §§ 10.1-10.5, at 759-875.
51 See id. § 10.3, at 798-99.
52 See MichaelS. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1 u 2-13 (1985).
53 This universal excuse is not recognized anywhere, of course. One does see it, however, in
the constant pressure to recognize new excuses and to expand the boundaries of existing excuses.
The constitutional decriminalization of the status of drug addiction, see Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), leads to the argument that an alcoholic must be excused for public
drunkenness, see, e.g. , Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968), and the argument that a heroin
addict must be excused for possession, see UnitedStates v. Moore, 486 F.2d u39, 1208 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Self-defense based on a reasonable apprehension of dangerousness becomes self-defense
based on a history of battering, see State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 555-56, 559 (Wash. 1977), and
diminished capacity due to abuse suffered as a child, seeState v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (Wash.
1993). Legitimate political concern for the welfare of the economically and socially deprived
seems to imply an excuse for the defendant with a "rotten social background." See David L.
Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 403-05 (1976); Richard
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As Michael Moore has shown in detail, the full range of excuses
can plausibly be framed in terms of a superseding cause breaking the
link between the defendant and the harm.54 Such interpretations of
the excuses, as Moore points out, turn on the humane and plausible
assumptions that to understand is to forgive and that to know the
cause is to understand. 5 5 Despite its intuitive appeal, however, the
causal theory is deeply :flawed. 1\vo of Moore's arguments against it
interest us here, because they bring out the central role of character
and judgment in inculpation.
First, Moore shows that a cause of behavior excuses only when it
has not been integrated into the character of the actor. He denies that
any incompatibility exists between saying that behavior is caused and
saying that it is the autonomous action of a person. 5 6 Consider the act
of raising my arm. Moore distinguishes cases in which someone else
raises my arm or when my arm goes up as a reflex from cases in
which I raise my arm because I have been raised as a Nazi or because
I believe it is the best way to reach my jacket. All four examples can
plausibly be cast in terms of caused action, but in the first pair the
ability or opportunity to exercise my will is absent. In the second pair,
though we can say why I will as I do, I do not lack the capacity to
will the act. 5 7 According to Moore, whether an act is excused depends
not only on whether we can trace a cause, but also on whether the
external cause bypasses the person herself. 58 In other words, an actor
is guilty if the criminal act is a deliberate act of will founded in her
Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & lNEQ. J. 9, 1 2-18 (1985); Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of
Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Baze/on, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 247, 1 2 58-67 (1976). Scien

tific evidence of the violent propensities of those with XYY chromosome syndrome is sent to the
jury with instructions on insanity or its use as a distinct defense. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 1 7 , § 4.8, at 535-4 1 ; David B. Saxe, Psychiatry, Sociopathy and the XYY Chromosome Syn
drome, 6 TULSA L.J. 243, 248-56 (1970); Susan Horan, Comment, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1343,
1353-72 (1992); Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEO. L.J. 892, 904-15 (1969).
54 Duress, as LaFave and Scott formulate it, exists when a threat "causes the defendant rea
sonably to believe that the only way to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself
or to another is to engage in conduct which violates the literal terms of the criminal law, . . . and
causes the defendant to engage in that conduct." 1 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 17, § 5 .3, at
6 14, cited in Moore, supra note 5 2 , at I I02. Intoxication, provided it is involuntary, excuses acts
performed under the influence - in some jurisdictions without any further showing that the
intoxication impaired the actor's reasoning capacity. See Moore, supra note 5 2 , at I I I0-1 1 . An
addiction such as alcoholism can be considered an excuse, because the disease operates as a com
pulsion on the actor. See id. at I I03. Mistakes of fact and mistakes about legal conclusions (for
example, the defense that I did not know that the umbrella I took was the property of another)
excuse when the mistaken belief is externally caused, rather than something I just choose to be
lieve. See id. at I I05.
55 See Moore, supra note 5 2 , at 1092.
56 See id. at I I3 2 .
57 See id. at 1 136.
58

See id.
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own character, rather than a direct result of a cause that is clearly
overbearing and external to her character.
Second, Moore also argues that it is not the intervention of a cause
that excuses, but an interference with the practical reason of the actor.
For instance, if a youth robs and beats people because his deprived
background has left him without another way to live and without any
compassion for his victims, it is fair to say that this background has
caused his criminal act. But it would not be accurate to say that he
was compelled so to act. We reserve the term compulsion for cases in
which the actor is unable to reason about or to choose what to do. 5 9
And it is only in cases of compulsion, not mere causation, that we
excuse. In a good case of duress, for example: if Baker has kidnapped
my wife and children and will kill them if I do not rob Able, my
choice is clear. I have been deprived of any meaningful opportunity to
reason about or to choose what I will do. "The difference between
compulsion and causation," Moore writes, "comes to this: compulsion
involves interference with practical reasoning. "60
We will return to the . problem of the determinist's defense,6 1 but
for now let us focus on the theory of inculpation implicit in Moore's
responses to it. Moore's responses complement one another. If my act
is compelled, it will not be a deliberate act arising from my character.
If the cause operates on me without reaching my will and character,
then my practical reason has not been engaged. We begin to see a
conception of inculpation at work that is sharply at odds with those
based on models of distributive justice. Rather than considering the
effects of possible rules of decision on the distribution of social goods,
the conception of inculpation implicit in Moore's responses to the de
terminist focuses on the individual who is on trial and the connection
between his actions and his character, specifically as it reveals the
quality of his judgment. Unfortunately, Moore does not develop these
implications. He fails to tell us what it is about practical reason or
character that makes its engagement a necessary condition to
inculpation.
5 9 Though gravity causes the planets to stay in orbit, it would be absurd to say that they are
compelled to orbit by gravity. See MORITZ SCHLICK, PROBLEMS OF ETHICS 147 (David Rynin
trans., 1939), cited in Moore, supra note 52, at n29 n.106.
60 Moore, supra note 52, at n29. One example may serve to sum this up. We know that
parents who abuse children are, overwhelmingly, abused children themselves. Poverty, drug
abuse, and stress, separately or in a common lethal mixture, also lead to child abuse. Despite our
clear fix on the causes, however, we are far from ready to recognize an excuse for assaults and
homicides of children, even when those antecedent causes are clearly established. The recognized
excuses look, not to external causes of wrongful acts, but to interference in the actor's autono
mous reasoning. If the child abuser's mental condition has deteriorated to a dissociative state so
that he is functioning as an automaton, watching his own actions go by as if they were on televi
sion, we are prepared to excuse. See, e.g., State v. Sommerville, 760 P.2d 932, 933, 936 (Wash.
1988) (acquitting the defendant, by reason of insanity, of murder but not of rape).
61 See infra Part IV.D.

1 995]

VIRTUE AND INCULPATION

1 443

George Fletcher's analysis of excuse leads to a similar impasse.
Fletcher clearly recognizes the centrality of character and judgment to
inculpation. Fletcher acknowledges that "[a]n inference from the
wrongful act to the actor's character is essential to a retributive theory
of punishment."6 2 He agrees with Moore that "[t]he only way to work
out a theory of excuses is to insist that the excuse represent a limited,
temporal distortion of the actor's character."63 Moreover, he agrees
that "[t]he circumstances surrounding the deed can yield an excuse
only so far as they distort the actor's capacity for choice in a limited
situation."64 We excuse, Fletcher explains, because the excusing condi
tions block any inference from the act to the person's character. "Typ
ically, if a bank teller opens a safe and turns money over to a
stranger, we can infer that he is dishonest. But if he does all this at
gunpoint, we cannot infer anything one way or the other about his
honesty."6� This explanation, like Moore's account of the excuses as
circumventions of character or as interference with practical reason,
promises a conception of inculpation quite different from that of the
distributive justice model. The natural implication of Fletcher's point
is that if we refuse to inculpate because an inference about character
is blocked, culpable acts must involve character that is in some sense
faulty.
However, while Moore fails to develop the implication that charac
ter and judgment play a role in inculpation, Fletcher actively avoids it.
Immediately upon concluding that excuse bars an inference about
character, Fletcher resorts to the conventional logic of excuse as a
matter of involuntary action. 66 Uncomfortable with the value-laden
terminology of the will, deliberation, reason, judgment, character, and
so on, Fletcher subsumes them all into a single, less overtly normative
psychological category.
In order to understand inculpation, we need to take seriously the
insights that Fletcher and Moore set aside as unworkable or not worth
pursuing. We need to face the implications they avoid. If excuse in
volves a bar to an inference about character, a good case of inculpa
tion involves flawed or blameworthy character. If excuse involves an
62

FLETCHER, supra note
63 Id. at 802 .
64 Id.

13,

§

I0.3.1,

at

800.

65 Id. at 7 99-800.
66 See id. § 10.3.2 , at 802-07. Fletcher does not mean that an excused act is literally involun
tary. He uses the term in a "normative," or metaphorical, sense. To explain when an act is or is
not "normatively" involuntary, Fletcher falls back on the notion of balancing interests. In a case
of duress, to use Fletcher's example, the compulsion must be of a type that a person of reasonable
firmness would not be able to resist. If faced with a choice between a broken finger and the
annihilation of a city, the appropriate moral balancing would result in a broken finger. According
to Fletcher, however, this balancing is itself a mere metaphor for an unexplicated sense of culpa
bility: "It is important to remember . . . that the balancing of interests is but a vehicle for making
a judgment about the culpability of the actor's surrendering to external pressure." Id. at 804.
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interference with practical reason, a good case of inculpation involves
the free exercise of practical reason - but an exercise of practical rea
son that is faulty in a normative dimension beyond the merely
instrumental.
Those inferences seem to leave us stranded. We do not have a the
ory of character or of practical reason that seems adequate to the task
of explaining inculpation. As with justification, our preference for in
strumental explanations that are congruent with the natural sciences
makes us wary of such unambiguously normative concepts. That the
criminal actor deserves blame and punishment because of the sort of
person he is or because of his faulty thinking seems a risky proposi
tion, both morally and intellectually.
We can, nevertheless, build such a theory of criminal law by draw
ing on Aristotle's Ethics . The Ethics suggests a reply to the determin
ist who asserts universal excuse and offers a way to understand the
normative psychological concepts that inevitably arise in connection
with excuse - practical reason, the will, deliberation, judgment, and
so on. Perhaps more important, we can analyze in Aristotelian terms
the questions of judgment and the good that, as we have seen, must
be addressed in connection with justification. Indeed, as I will argue,
Aristotle's account of character and practical judgment as they relate
to virtue and the good provides the basis for a comprehensive theory
of inculpation.
III.

THE ARISTOTELIAN ELEMENTS OF A REPUBLICAN
CRIMINAL LAW

In his leading treatise, Aristotle's First Principles , T.H. Irwin
writes:
If [Aristotle] ascribes intrinsic value to political activities, then some in
stitutional and constitutional arrangements that might seem to raise only
questions of efficiency will in fact be open to another kind of evaluation.
We might think that in deciding how many citizens should take what
sort of part in government, we need only consider the instrumental func
tion of one or another arrangement, and need only ask how efficiently it
secures some benefit that is its causal result. But if a particular sort of
political activity is itself part of the human good, then the argument for
its presence in a city cannot be purely instrumental, and we need not,
and should not, defend it on purely instrumental grounds. 67

Inculpation is such an institution. As I argued in the preceding sec
tion, a number of reasons exist to doubt the utility of instrumental
explanations here. Inculpation is more than an instance or aspect of
distributive justice - it has intrinsic value as part of the good life for
human beings.
67 TERENCE H. IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES § 2 16,

at

402 (1988).
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"The good life" may seem an odd phrase here, but it has the right
note of ambiguity. Aristotle is concerned with the good in the
broadest sense: the common good or the good of humankind. 68 The
central thesis of the Ethics is that the good can be found and served
by seeking one's own happiness - eudaimonia - if that happiness is
properly understood. 69 Eudaimonia requires an extended concern for
friends and for others in the political community because only that
sort of concern will lead to a full development of one's capacities and
potential as a human being. 70 Political life is genuinely constitutive of
the person.
Inculpation is a part of this constitutive political life. It does not
serve the greater good by indirectly promoting it, by ensuring the
greatest good for the greatest number, or by any other instrumental
formula. Inculpation is an act of communal interpretation that we en
gage in as we construct a good life. 7 1 To be sure, inculpation deters
harm. Aristotle is no ascetic; he appreciates the necessity of a basic
supply of primary goods, including bodily integrity and property. 7 2
That effect, however, is secondary to inculpation itself, to the judging
of another member of the community and her actions. In that judg
ing, we are concerned not only with the effects of her actions, but also
with her decisions . We care about the quality of the accused's practi
cal judgment, for it is by means of that faculty that the accused par
ticipates with us in the conduct and construction of our shared
political life. We are equally concerned, however, with the exercise of
our own practical judgment in one of the central events of our polit
ical life - the inculpation of another.
A.

Responsibility and the Rational Agent

We have seen how Fletcher resorts to voluntariness as a proxy for
character in his account of inculpation. 73 It is helpful to see why that
move is mistaken and why one cannot escape the more overtly norma
tive vocabulary of the will, practical judgment, and character. Sup
pose I have a horse that I keep in a pasture next to my neighbor's
orchard. Some of her apples hang within reach of my property. My
horse ambles over, stretches across the fence, and takes one. Is he
guilty of theft? The absurdity of the question is proof enough that
voluntariness is not sufficient to define inculpation or any other vari
ety of moral responsibility. My horse's action is clearly voluntary: he
68 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at I.2.
69 See id. at I.4.ro95a, I.7; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 208, at 389.
70 See IRWIN, supra note 67, §§ 2u-217, at 393-406.
7 1 "The relation between fellow-citizens expresses, instead of simply facilitating, the extended
concern and interest that realizes each person's capacities. That is why relations within a city are
a part of each person's happiness, and not simply a means to it." Id. § 217, at 406.
72 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at II.8.1099a-1099b; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 206, at 385-86.
7 3 See supra p. 1443.
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sees an opportunity and directs himself to it. A great deal of what
might allow us to say he is responsible, however, is clearly missing.
It is surprising, then, to find that Aristotle seems to agree with
Fletcher that voluntariness is the defining feature of responsibility.
Aristotle writes:
Virtue or excellence is, as we have seen, concerned with emotions and
actions. When these are voluntary we receive praise and blame; when
involuntary, we are pardoned and sometimes even pitied. Therefore, it
is, I dare say, indispensable for a student of virtue to differentiate be
tween voluntary and involuntary actions, and useful also for lawgivers,
to help them in meting out honors and punishments. 74

Aristotle then considers classic examples of lesser evils and duress in
terms of whether the constraint is sufficient or of the right kind to
render the action involuntary and so to excuse it. 7 5
But consider the following passage:
Now, since the end is the object of wish, and since the means to the end
are the objects of deliberation and choice, it follows that actions con
cerned with means are based on choice and are voluntary actions. And
the activities in which the virtues find their expression deal with means.
Consequently, virtue or excellence depends on ourselves, and so does
vice. 7 6

Despite some familiar words, this passage is not altogether clear. In
reading Aristotle, we soon realize that we are likely to err if we import
into the Ethics our own categories of personality, causation, voluntari
ness, and responsibility. Aristotle's psychofogy is fundamentally differ
ent from ours. As I will argue below, however, we have every reason
to take his psychology seriously.
Most of what Aristotle says elsewhere in the Ethics makes it plain
that his conceptions of voluntariness and responsibility bear little re
semblance to ours. In Book III, chapter v, Aristotle contends that
each person is responsible for his own character. 7 7 If I act in igno
rance, but do not regret my action, Aristotle contends that I have not
acted involuntarily. 78 Similarly, if I am physically forced into an ac
tion, but take pleasure in it, he suggests that I have not acted involun
tarily. 7 9 These contentions appear odd and insupportable. In our
usage, my pleasure or regret over my actions has no bearing on volun
tariness and certainly cannot render an ignorant or compelled action
voluntary. We ask only whether, roughly speaking, I am the cause of
the action or have an opportunity to act otherwise.
74
75
76
77
78
79

ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at ill.1.r ro9b.
See id. at ill.r . r ro9- r r roa.
Id. at ill.5.1r r 3b.
See id. at ill.5.1rr 3b.
See id. at ill.r .1r rob.
See id. at ill. r.1nob; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 182, at 342.
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Our differences with Aristotle come down to this: we tend to think
of the person in this context as a causal agent and nothing more. He
thinks of the person as a rational agent, with a minimum set of facul
ties that one must possess to be a candidate for responsibility, and that
are fully in play when one acts in a truly voluntary fashion. 80 One
cannot understand Aristotle's arguments on responsibility, especially
the argument that one is responsible for one's own character, unless
one has a grasp of these various faculties and of the extent to which
they transform our understanding of the moral agent.
Aristotle 's rational agent is guided by prohairesis, variously trans
lated as choice, decision or deliberative desire;81 and by boulesis, usu
ally translated as wish, but more a rational desire for the good. 82 We
ordinarily take desire 's object to be some immediate pleasure or end,
and assume that when our ends conflict they can be reconciled under
some relatively simple calculus of their respective strengths. The sort
of decision denoted by prohairesis is more deeply deliberative. I do
not consider the strength of my desires so much as the place of each in
a whole life. I consider my desires critically; I ask how I came to have
them, whether I ought to have them at all, and whether some other
desires might not serve me better. 83 Decision, in Aristotle 's terms, is
not determined by my current appetites or immediate needs, but by
boulesis , my wish for the good. 84 Boulesis, in turn, depends on
prohairesis; they are reciprocal. 85 My good, in this context, is compre
hensive - much more than simple satisfaction. My good is to be, to
the fullest extent possible, what each human being essentially is: a ra
tional being.86
That conception of the good obviously requires elaboration and de
fense, and we will take it up in the next section. For now, however,
let us stay with the question of responsibility and consider what sort
of rational agency Aristotle has in mind. The faculties of prohairesis
and boulesis are distinctively human faculties. 87 My horse has the
ability to direct himself to cause external events; he can act, in our
modern, limited sense, voluntarily. What he lacks, however, is the
ability to conceive of himself as persisting through time, or as being
See IRWIN, supra note 67, §182, at 343-44.
81 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at ill.2 , ill.3.II 13a; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 1 79, at 337.
82 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5 , at ill.4.1I I3a n.15; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 1 74, at 331-32,
§ 1 79, at 337 & n.2 2 , §191, at 359-60.
83 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at ill.2 . I I I Ih-1 I I 2 a; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 1 79, at 337.
8 4 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at ill.4.1 I I3a.
85 As Irwin describes it:
This deliberation about what promotes living well as a whole will form the wise person's
rational wish, the way she conceives happiness; and this conception of happiness will be
the rational wish from which she begins the sort of deliberation that results in a decision.
IRWIN, supra note 67, § 1 79, at 337.
86 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at I.7.1098a; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 199, at 3 74.
8 7 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at ill.2 . I I I Ib.
80
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possessed of certain capacities that can be developed to a greater or
lesser extent, or as a member of a society, or as having a final good
that depends on all of these things and more. My horse, in short,
lacks the ability to shape a life into a satisfying and adequate whole.
To Aristotle, this means that my horse lacks the essentials for re
sponsibility or truly voluntary action. In the passage quoted earlier to
suggest Aristotle 's distance from us on those issues, he insists that "de
liberation" and "wish" are necessary aspects of voluntariness. 88 That
position seems initially to be consistent with our conception of volun
tariness as self-direction. The appearance is misleading, however, be
cause of the added weight those terms carry in the Ethics. In
Aristotle 's terms, deliberation and wish - prohairesis and boulesis have to do specifically with the rational construction of a whole life
over time. 89
Bearing that in mind, one can see why a rational agent so con
ceived might be not considered to be acting involuntarily when he
takes pleasure in a compelled act or when he does not regret some
thing done in ignorance. In such cases, the satisfaction reveals the
act's accord with the actor's conception of his life, and the act is in
that sense more thoroughly of or from the actor than if he were merely
its cause. We also begin to see how Aristotle can attribute responsibil
ity for my character to me. If I have the capacity to reflect on my
ends, the means by which I would achieve them, and the relation of
both to a whole life, I have the capacity as well to shape my life in
each particular decision that I make. I am responsible for my charac
ter to the extent I am responsible for the decisions I make about the
ends and effects that shape it. 90 Of course, an answer to the determin
ist 's standard objection is needed here, and one will follow. 9 1 For
now, however, we need at least to be clear that in treating issues of
responsibility, Aristotle conceives of the person as more than just a
cause of external events.
This conception of the person gives us part of what we need to
rethink inculpation in Aristotelian terms. I have argued against instru
mental accounts of inculpation, in part on the ground that the person
at the center of such theories is a cause of harm and nothing more.
B eginning with that truncated view cuts off a full consideration of
character and the good in our thinking about inculpation - despite
the fact that the rest of our thinking about inculpation tells us that
character and the good are central to it. Aristotle provides us with a
88 See
89 See
338-39.
90 See
91 See

supra p. 1446.
ARISTOTLE, supra note S, at I.7 .1098a, VIII.10 .u6oa; IRWIN, supra note 6 7 , § 1 80, at
IRWIN, supra note 67, § 182, at 344.
infra Part IV.D.
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different way of understanding ourselves - as more than just causes
of events - which gets to the heart of inculpation.
B.

Self Realization and the Good

We are concerned here not only with responsibility, but also with
virtue. When Aristotle says that a person is responsible for his own
character, he means it. There does exist a state of character which is
preferable to others in a fully normative sense. Before addressing the
specifics of virtue, we need to understand how Aristotle gets to that
normative level. In what has been said so far, no ground is apparent
for preferring one life over another or for praising one set of decisions
rather than another. The responsible agent exhibits prohairesis and
boulesis, which are specifically concerned with the construction of a
whole life. But in what sense, we might ask, am I or should I be
concerned with the construction of �uch a life, rather than just the
satisfaction of my immediate desires? Furthermore, even granted that
I can construct a whole life out of my conception of the good and the
consequent course of decision, is there any reason that the shape of
that life cannot reflect whatever I happen to prefer as my good?
Aristotle opens the Nicomachean Ethics by arguing that our
desires have a structure. We can identify one end which is pursued for
its own sake, which our immediate ends ultimately serve and for the
sake of which everything else is done. He identifies this final end as
eudaimonia .92 The word is usually translated as "happiness," but that
translation is misleading in this context. Happiness can be renounced
in favor of something else: nobility, godliness, or the happiness of
others, for example. 93 The eudaimonia which, according to Aristotle,
is the final end and self-sufficient good, is better translated as "the best
possible life." As J.L. Ackrill points out: "This is why there can be
plenty of disagreement as to what form of life is eudaimonia, but no
disagreement that eudaimonia is what we all want."94
Of course, the conclusion that the good of humankind is to live the
best possible life is very nearly tautological. Aristotle notes this prob
lem and argues that the best life or the highest good depends on the
characteristic function - the ergon - of human beings,95 which he
92 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at I.6.1097a-1097b.
93 See J.L. Aclrrill, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 15, 24
(Amelie 0. Rorty ed., 1980) [hereinafter ESSAYS].
94 Id.

95 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at I.7.1097b. The categorization of beings by their character
istic function, or ergon, is fundamental to Aristotle's teleological science. It is foreign to us, no
doubt, but on the other hand, we should not read too much into it. To say that our good depends
on our distinctive function is only to say that, in determining what is the good for humans, we
need to heed what sort of beings we are. If we do not, we will address the wrong problem:
determining some other being's good, not our own. See IRWIN, supra note 67, § 194, at 365.
When Aristotle argues that the human ergon is not nutrition and growth because plants have
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then identifies as the ability to reason. 96 Specifically, Aristotle con
cludes that the ergon of man is the life of rationality in action, 97 as
opposed to the mere possession of rationality. 98 Aristotle's concern is
to define not so much the good for humans as the good in humans that aspect of humanity which can be made the leading principle in
human life, so as to lead to an end or purpose needing no further
justification.
The fundamental question for Aristotle 's rational agent, as for us,
is: what shall I do? I might seek the satisfaction of the desires I find
myself in possession of, but Aristotle relies on our considered judgment
that such a life is unworthy. 99 Out of the most basic concern for my
self, I will attend not only to my immediate desires, nor even just to
my future desires, but primarily to the human capacities that underlie
my desires. It makes sense for me, as a rational agent, to seek a life
that draws on the greatest range of those capacities. 100 Eudaimonia,
the best possible life, is simply the most complete human life, in that
sense of "complete."
those functions, and is not perception because the lower animals have that function, see ARIS
TOTLE, supra note 5, at I.7 .1097b-1098a, he does not deny or diminish the importance of those
functions to human life. He means only that they are not distinctive to us and do not provide a
complete description of us.
96 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at I.7.1098a.
97 Aristotle writes:
The proper function of man, then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a
rational principle or, at least, not without it. In speaking of the proper function of a given
individual we mean that it is the same in kind as the function of an individual who sets
high standards for himself . . . .
Id. at I.7,1098a.
98 See id. at I.7.1098a. The latter point is obscured later in the Ethics when Aristotle sug
gests that eudaimonia consists exclusively of the contemplative life. See id. at
X.7 . I I 77a-X.8. I I 79a. We may set that controversy aside for the moment. The better argument
seems to be the contention that eudaimonia is a more comprehensive quality than the contempla
tive life. See Ackrill, supra note 93, at 29 ("And the whole further development of the work, with
its detailed discussion of moral virtues and its stress upon the intrinsic value of good action,
follows naturally if (but only if) the conclusion of the ergon argument is understood to refer to
complete and not to some one particular virtue."); see also Amelie 0. Rorty, The Place of Contem
plation in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, in ESSAYS, supra note 93, at 377, 391-92 (reconciling
competing views). But see Robert Heinaman, Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency in the
Nichomachean Ethics, 33 PHRONESIS 31, 32-35 (1988) (taking contemplation as happiness);
Thomas Nagel, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, 17 PHRONESIS 2 5 2 , 25 7-59 (1972) (discussing contempla
tion of the divine as happiness).
99 Aristotle writes:
No one would choose to live his entire life with the mentality of a child, even if he were to
enjoy to the fullest possible extent what children enjoy; nor would he choose to find his
joy in doing something very base, even though he were to escape any painful
consequences.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at X.3 . I I 74a.
100 This insight, it should be noted, plays an important role in Rawls's theory of justice. He
uses what he calls the "Aristotelian Principle" as a principle of motivation in the original position.
See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, at 42 7-28.
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Eudaimonia, then, is not mere contentment or satisfaction, but the
attainment of distinctively human purposes. The normative force of
Aristotelian ethics, the reason we should pursue such an end, is bound
up in eudaimonia so defined. We would live such a life not to con
form or to comply, but because such a life is the best we can have. 101
This principle might be framed as a matter of self-interest, were
the terminology of self-interest not completely engrossed by the tradi
tion of Hobbes and his heirs in modern market economics. That tradi
tion assumes a fundamental conflict between the self and the rest of
humanity. Aristotle, in contrast, sees a direct connection between
eudaimonia and life among others. The final good is self-sufficient, he
argues, in a special sense:
[W]e define something as self-sufficient not by reference to the "self'
alone. We do not mean a man who lives his life in isolation, but a man
who also lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends and fellow citi
zens generally, since man is by nature a social and political being. 1 02

If we are mystified by this intimate connection between my final,
highest good and political life, it is because of our unexamined as
sumption that serving the good of others or of all necessarily detracts
from our own.
Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia and its connection to the de
velopment of human capacities helps us to see an alternative sort of
altruism. 103 Aristotle describes friendship as concern for another in
himself, because of himself, or because he is who he is. 104 I am con
cerned with my friend as for myself; specifically, I am concerned with
him as a rational agent. I care about his development and the scope
of his life, just as I do for my own. 105 Indeed, my concerns are indis
tinguishable: in seeking the good of my friend, I encounter additional
opportunities for my own self-realization. 106 Simply because humans
live together rather than alone, the complete human life I seek will
entail a significant involvement with others and with the construction
of their lives. 107
The same principle extends beyond friendship to political life. My
self-realization requires political involvement because such involve
ment presents additional, necessary opportunities to draw upon and
101

See IRWIN, supra note 6 7 , § 241, at 447-48, 421-22 .
supra note 5 , at I.7.1097b; see also id. at IX.9.n69b (reiterating that "man is a

102 ARISTOTLE,

social and political being" in the context of discussing the relationship between friendship and
happiness).
103 Miriam Galston makes the point that the leaders of the republican revival often mistakenly
portray civic virtue as necessarily requiring self-sacrifice. See Galston, supra note 7, at 344.
104 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at VIIl.3.n56b, IX.4.n66a-n66b, IX.8.u68b.
105 See id. at IX.4.n66a.
1 06 See id. at IX.9.II 7oa, IX.1 1 .n 7 1b-IX.1 2 .n72a.
107 See id. at IX.8.n69a-I I 69b, IX.9.n69b.
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develop my human capacities. 108 It is in this sense that Aristotle sees
humans as essentially political animals. This conception of selves and
of politics, however, leaves out the war of all against all. We are polit
ical not just because we have been thrown in together, but because we
present each other with the opportunity for more complete lives.
The normative force of Aristotelian ethics comes out of this special
sort of self-concern. The virtuous life, for Aristotle, is the life of full
involvement with the community's good. The mark of virtue is not
conformity to external standards, but practical wisdom - an excel
lence of deliberation and decision in an active, engaged life. That life
is the one we ought to pursue, not because any variety of god tells us
to, but simply because it is the best life we, as human beings, can
have.
C. Aristotle's Conception of Virtue
In Book II of the Ethics , Aristotle specifies virtue as action and
emotion in accord with the mean. 109 On the surface, this definition
sounds banal, like a call to timidity or complacency. That criticism
assumes, however, that the mean is a known quantity, a determinate
rule of prudence with which one must simply comply. It is not. On
the contrary, Aristotle deliberately refuses to provide such a rule, and
his reasons for doing so are at the heart of the Ethics .
Aristotle defines virtue in this central passage:
We may thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a characteristic involv
ing choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a
mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical
wisdom would use to determine it. 1 1 0

Any resemblance to or suggestion of a Rawlsian thought experiment is
purely coincidental. Aristotle does not set out to say what the mean
is , nor does he provide a decisionmaking procedure for determining
what it is. He provides instead a description of practical wisdom in
action and of virtue's organic definition in a life guided by practical
wisdom. "[V]irtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice
. . . . "1 1 1 We can draw two points of Aristotle's larger argument out of
that clause. Aristotle makes clear elsewhere that choice entails deliber
ation. 1 1 2 He notes that we deliberate only over that which is contin
gent, which can be other than what it is, and not over that which is as
it is by necessity. 1 1 3 We neither choose nor deliberate about mathe-

See id. at IX.9.n69b-n 7oa; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 2 1 7, at 405 .
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at II.6.rro6b.
Id. at II.6.r ro6b-no7a.
1 1 1 Id.
1 1 2 See id. at III. 2 .r n 2a.
1 13 See id. at III.3.n r 2a-n r 2b.
108
1 09
1 10
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matics or logic. 1 14 That virtue thus concerns only the contingent, un
determined parts of human life will prove to be significant.
The second point concerns the objects of this deliberation. Aris
totle appears to assert in Book III of the Ethics that humans deliber
ate about means, but not ends. 1 1 5 In Book VI, however, he writes as
if we deliberate about ends as well. 1 16 The apparent contradiction is
generally resolved in favor of Book VI. 1 1 7 This issue is far more than
a point of translation. The possibility of our deliberating on ends is
critical to our understanding of the Ethics . To his everlasting credit,
Aristotle understood that life is not simply a matter of maximizing.
We cannot maximize utility, efficiency, or any other value unless we
know, in concrete terms, what we want . The assumption that humans
maximize whatever it is they do happen to want has its place as a
theoretical assumption in economic theory, and a similar assumption is
the central pillar of deontological political theory. However, for Aris
totle 's purposes, for a description of life as it is actually lived, the as
sumption is plainly misleading. In real life, we deliberate over
competing courses of action, and our deliberations concern ends, not
just the means to maximize fixed ends. 1 1 8 Because he is concerned
with this deeper sort of deliberation, Aristotle cannot simply take our
desires as a given. He is concerned with what those desires are and
how we arrive at them.
It is the combination of these two premises - that we deliberate
about only that which is contingent and that we deliberate about our
ends - that makes it impossible to reduce to a determinate rule either
See id. at III.3.1 u 2b.
See id.
See id. at VI.9.u42 b.
1 1 7 Scholars have frequently noted that Aristotle fails to distinguish between means that are
instruments to achieving an end - such as moving a chair in order to reach a light bulb - and
means that are constitutive of an end - such as moving one's queen in a game of chess. See,
e.g., David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS, supra note 93, at 2 2 1, 2 2 4 .
Wiggins points out that the phrase Aristotle actually uses, pros to telos, is better translated as
"toward the end," rather than as "means to an end." Id. at 2 23-24. He argues that the Greek
phrase comprehends both the instrumental and constitutive senses of "means." See id. at 2 2 4-2 7 ;
see also Ackrill, supra note 93, at 19 ("That the primary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the
sake of eudaimonia is not incompatible with their being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia is
constituted by activities that are ends in themselves.'). Although that argument does not salvage
Aristotle's failed hope of using the instrumental sense of "means" to illuminate the constitutive
sense, it does mean at least that Book III does not deny the possibility of deliberating on ends.
See Wiggins, supra, at 2 2 4-2 7 .
1 1 8 Wiggins writes:
There are theories of practical reason according to which the ordinary situation of an
agent who deliberates resembles nothing so much as that of a snooker player who has to
choose from a large number of possible shots that shot which rates highest [as a probable
success] . . . . But with ordinary deliberation it is quite different. There is nothing which
a man is under antecedent sentence to maximize; and probabilities, though difficult and
relevant, need not be the one great crux of the matter.
Wiggins, supra note I I 7, at 2 3 2 .
114
115
1 16
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the mean that constitutes virtue or the choosing involved in virtue. In
deciding on a course of action, the parameters of the problem are not
immediately apparent to us. We must figure out both how to live a
good life and what a good life is. We set goals, identify the relevant
concerns, frame the issues, assess the limits of the possible, hypothesize
solutions, and test and revise those solutions in a constant and infinite
process of feedback, adjustment, and incremental advancement. That
process, dialectical by nature, is Aristotle's focus in the definition of
virtue as the mean. 1 1 9
Virtue is the dialectic as the man of practical wisdom conducts it.
Aristotle writes: "Virtue or excellence is not only a characteristic which
is guided by right reason, but also a characteristic which is united
with right reason; and right reason in moral matters is practical wis
dom. " 1 20 The centerpiece of Aristotle 's Ethics, then, is practical wis
dom, or phronesis .
D.

Phronesis and the Dialectic of the Good

Phronesis is the ability to deliberate on and frame an overall con
ception of the good life - that is, the life well lived - and to inte
grate one 's particular choices into that all-encompassing conception. 1 2 1
The person possessed of phronesis, the phronimos, is a person of ma
ture judgment who does not simply know universal truths or the par
ticular facts from which universal principles can be inferred. She is
one, rather, who has the capacity to integrate the universal and the
particular: to identify and pursue the good amid the contingencies of
practical human affairs. 1 2 2
Phronesis is familiar to us in our everyday lives. It is a quality of
mind we recognize in those whose wisdom, judgment, or sagacity we
As Wiggins puts it:
The man of highest practical wisdom is the man who brings to bear upon a situation the
greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations
commensurate with the importance of the deliberative context. The best practical syllo
gism is that whose minor premise arises out of such a man's perceptions, concerns, and
appreciations. It records what strikes such a man . . . in the situation [as the] most salient
feature of the context in which he has to act. This activates a corresponding major prem
ise that spells out the general import of the concern that makes this feature the salient
feature in the situation. . . . Its evaluation is of its essence dialectical, and all of a piece
with the perceptions and reasonings that gave rise to the syllogism in the first place.
Id. at 234.
120 ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at VI.r3.I I44b.
1 2 1 As Aristotle describes it:
Practical wisdom . . . is concerned with human affairs and with matters about which
deliberation is possible. As we have said, the most characteristic function of a man of
practical wisdom is to deliberate well: no one deliberates about things that cannot be other
than they are, nor about things that are not directed to some end, an end that is a good
attainable by action. In an unqualified sense, that man is good at deliberating who, by
reasoning, can aim at and hit the best thing attainable to man by action.
Id. at VI.7.I I4rb.
122 See id. at VI.7.rr4rb-VI.9.I I42b; Wiggins, supra note r r7, at 235-37.
1 19
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admire, and which we are proud to discover in ourselves if we can.
The phronimos navigates the world of practical human affairs with a
judicious eye for particulars, generating flexible, creative responses to
the circumstances in which she finds herself, without relying on doc
trine or ideology, without demanding certainty - and yet never being
overwhelmed by detail or falling victim to confusion, doubt, or hesita
tion. The product of phronesis is action, not understanding. 1 2 3 The
phronimos is one who simply does the right thing in the given
circumstances. 124
The truth that the phronimos locates in the particulars of contin
gent human affairs is, specifically, the good. Phronesis is not mere
cleverness, nor is the excellence of deliberation that the phronimos dis
plays merely sound instrumental reasoning. 1 25 The object of the
phronimos 's deliberations is not only the means to her given ends but
those ends themselves. It is her concern with the good that distin
guishes the phronimos from one who is merely clever. 1 2 6 This good is
not merely her own good but a broader, political good. Aristotle notes
that phronesis is commonly held to be a matter of knowing one 's own
good. "And yet," he writes, "surely one 's own good cannot exist with
out household management nor without a political system." 1 2 7 Indeed,
the good for the person and the good of politics are recognized as in
separable throughout the Ethics . 128
Just as phronesis is distinguished from cleverness by a concern
with the good, the truly virtuous are distinguished from the naturally
good by their possessing phronesis. "We tend to be just, capable of
self-control, and to show all our other character traits from the time of
our birth. Yet we still seek something more, the good in a fuller sense,
1 23 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at VI.7.I I41b, VI.10.II43a.
l 24 Phronesis, not surprisingly, is never found among the young. However skilled a young
person might be in mathematics, for example, he cannot be expected to display phronesis: "The
reason is that practical wisdom is concerned with particulars as well <as with universals>, and
knowledge of particulars comes from experience. But a young man has no experience, for experi
ence is the product of a long time." Id. at VI.9.1142a.
12 5 See id. at VI.12 .I I 44a.
12 6 Aristotle writes:
Without virtue or excellence, this eye of the soul, <intelligence,> does not acquire the char
acteristic <of practical wisdom> . . . . For wickedness distorts and causes us to be com
pletely mistaken about the fundamental principles of action. Hence it is clear that a man
cannot have practical wisdom unless he is good.

Id.

12 7
128

Id. at VI.8.II42a.
Aristotle writes:
This good, one should think, belongs to the most sovereign and most comprehensive
master science, and politics clearly fits this description. . . . Since this science uses the rest
of the sciences, and since, moreover, it legislates what people are to do and what they are
not to do, its end seems to embrace the ends of the other sciences. Thus it follows that the
end of politics is the good for man.
Id. at l.2. 1094a-ro94b.
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and the possession of these traits in another way. " 1 2 9 The "something
more" is the possession of individual virtues with a consciousness of
their underlying practical logic, so that in possessing one virtue, we
possess all. True virtue is a hexis prohairetike, a fixed, deliberative
disposition toward the good, in which the truth of the good pursued is
ensured by phronesis, or excellence in deliberation. 1 30 Indeed, Aris
totle concludes, as already noted, that virtue and phronesis are
identical.
It is the fact that final ends and the good are in play that gives
phronesis its distinctive quality as an intellectual faculty. Its dialecti
cal nature is well articulated by David Wiggins:
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning even
as well as mathematical logic recapitulates or reconstructs the actual ex
perience of conducting or exploring deductive argument, can treat the
concerns which an agent brings to any situation as forming a closed,
complete, consistent system. For it is of the essence of these concerns to
make competing and inconsistent claims. (This is a mark not of irration
ality but of rationality in the face of the plurality of ends and the plural
ity of human goods.) The weight of the claims represented by these
concerns is not necessarily fixed in advance. Nor need the concerns be
hierarchically ordered. Indeed, a man's reflection on a new situation that
confronts him may disrupt such order and fixity as had previously ex
isted, and bring a change in his evolving conception of the point (to hou
heneka), or the several or many points, of living or acting. 1 3 1
Indeed, it should come as no surprise that a faculty or quality of mind
that takes as its objects the contingent and the particular in human
desire and action, deliberating with an eye to the good not only of the
self, but also of the self in the context of all, should be fundamentally
indeterminate. Plainly, no determinate set of universally applicable
rules could comprehend and regulate such complexity. We know im
plicitly that no such rules exist to bring order to life - if, that is, we
see life as more than a matter of maximizing those ends we do have,
and begin to contemplate what ends we ought to have.

IV. A

REPUBLICAN THEORY OF INCULPATION

The ends one ought to have is the special concern of the criminal
law. We use that particular body of law to examine, assess, and,
where proper, condemn the choices individuals make in forming and
pursuing their particular visions of the good. We do so legitimately
because of the interest each of us has in the quality of others ' delibera
tions on the good - an interest that arises from the inescapable fact
that the good of each of us is inextricable from the good of all. If,
1 29 Id. at VI.13 .u44b.
1 30 See id. at VI.9.u42a-u42b.
13 1 Wiggins, supra note I I 7, at 233.
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with Aristotle, we take virtue to be a quality of excellence in one's
conceiving the good and formulating a scheme of ends, inculpation is a
judgment on virtue.
Virtue is a feature of republican political theory, a theory strongly
at odds with current conceptions of democracy. Republicanism is a
teleological theory of politics. It supposes there is an end, a purpose, a
greater good served by political association. That greater good is not,
as we are accustomed to thinking of it, the aggregate good of society 's
members or the sum of their individual desires. 132 Whereas liberalism
takes the good to be the aggregate of individual preferences or con
cerns itself with the distribution of primary goods and a fair opportu
nity to pursue one's own idea of the good, republican theory posits a
greater good that transcends and comprehends individual prefer
ences.133 The good, broadly conceived, is independent of individual
desires, and individual desire may quite reasonably be expected to
serve it.
The agenda of the first substantive section of this Arti�le ought
now to be apparent. My aim was to suggest that a republican crimi
nal law is not a proposed reform, but what we have now. Deontologi
cal political theory, whatever its merits in explaining distributive
justice, is inadequate to explaining criminal justice. We need an alter
native theory to cope with the fact that the criminal law condemns the
decisions and actions of individuals in their pursuit of the good as they
conceive it. The aspiration to neutrality with regard to individual con
ceptions of the good - which, however it is formulated, is the princi
pal feature of deontological theories of distributive justice 134
132 See WOOD, supra note 6, at 58.
133 As Ronald Beiner observes:
The basic point is this: If our world succumbs to nuclear or ecological catastrophe, we all
suffer the same fate; if injustice, inequality, and political oppression run rampant in our
world, we are all diminished as human beings; if the absence of a common culture leads to
a new, postliterate barbarism, we are all the worse for it. The minimum notion of commu
nity required to cope with these grave political realities is the sense that our fate, for good
or ill, is a shared one, from which no one can sensibly retreat into a private domain of
either pleasures of consumption or burdens of conscience. The great mistake of liberalism
is to pretend that all modernity forces us to regard private morality as reigning supreme
and public morality as limited to the business of negotiating the "successful accommoda
tion" between ourselves as rational individuals. The problem with liberalism is not that it
deprives us of the delights of communal attachments, whether national, ethnic, sectarian,
or whatever, but that it tends to cause us to forget that our destiny in this dangerous
world of ours is a collective destiny, and that the perils of insufficient citizenship are like
wise shared.
RONALD BEINER, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH LIBERALISM? 34 (1992) (citation omitted).
134 Rawls acknowledges that justice as fairness is not procedurally neutral because it does
more than organize a decision procedure based on such values as impartiality, consistency of
application, and equal opportunity to be heard. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 192.
Nor is justice as fairness neutral in its effect, because "the facts of commonsense political sociol
ogy" tell us that a liberal regime is likely to affect the viability of comprehensive moral doctrines
in terms of adherents and converts. Id. at 193-94. Stripped of those connotations of "neutrality,"
however, he argues that justice as fairness is neutral in aim in the sense of preserving for persons
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renders deontology useless in explaining and understanding inculpation
as it now occurs .
A.

Inculpation as a Judgment on Virtue

As noted in Part I, every defendant has excuses and justifications
for his actions and, regardless of society's evaluation of his defenses,
they hold good in his own mind. Those who commit crimes do so
incidentally, as it were; not just to cause harm but in the pursuit of
other ends, and by the use of means, the legitimacy of which they
assert by their actions. In finding them guilty, we necessarily reject
and condemn their pursuit of those ends or their use of those means.
Their offense is, in the final analysis, a failure of practical judgment:
they have failed to assemble and pursue an appropriate scheme of
ends premised on an adequate conception of the good. We blame and
punish them for that failure.
This thesis is the conception of inculpation to which Moore and
Fletcher allude in their different ways, but which neither elaborates.
Moore argues that excuses involve an interference with practical rea
son, but does not pursue the implication that culpable acts must there
fore exhibit practical reason which is in some sense faulty. 135 Fletcher
observes that a good excuse serves to bar our assessing the actor's
character, but he declines to follow out the implication that a bad
character is some part of culpability. 136 If, with Aristotle, we take
practical judgment as the prime constituent of character, Fletcher and
Moore can be said to share a single insight. Neither chose to pursue
it, but it rings true to those with a working acquaintance with crimi
nal behavior.
If, despite the weight of scholarly authority, we decide to place
character and practical judgment at the center of inculpation, what is
our war.rant for doing so? How do we justify an assessment of an
other's virtue with such extraordinary consequences? The answer de
pends in large part on what we mean by virtue. If we take it in the
colloquial sense as conformity to a code of behavior, the demand for
justification rightly shifts to a demand for justification of that code.
Orthodox believers have no difficulty with that demand, ready as they
are to affirm the authority of a divine being, but in a constitutional
democracy with a heterogeneous population, any such approach to vir
tue and inculpation is doomed to fail.
Aristotelian virtue has a singular advantage in this regard in that it
relies at all points on the exercise of individual judgment. To apprecian "equal opportunity to advance any permissible conception [of the good]." Id. at 193. Dwor
kin 's theory that the state is not to promote or assist any particular comprehensive moral doctrine
is, according to Rawls, also neutral in aim. See id. at 193 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 2).
135 See Moore, supra note 52, at 1129.
136 See FLETCHER, supra note 13, § ro.3, at 799-807.

1995]

VIRTUE AND INCULPATION

1 45 9

ate this advantage, recall the reason for virtue's importance to republi
can political theory: if action springs from a virtuous self, the greater
good will be served without the need to coerce compliance with
norms. Aristotle defines virtue almost as if he had that problem in
mind. Each of us is concerned with our own happiness. True happi
ness requires the construction of a whole life, drawing on the greatest
range of our innate human capacities. Such a life demands friendship
and political engagement with the life of the community. One who is
fully successful in this enterprise is the phronimos, the person who can
reconcile her own ends with a larger vision of the ends of her society.
That, for Aristotle, is virtue: not conformity, but a quality of
judgment.
In this light, the good is not a given, not a monolithic, prescriptive
constraint on action; it is not even determinate. Both virtue and the
good are defined in the course of the life well lived, in reciprocal rela
tion to each other and in a constant dialectic with the world of practi
cal experience. Neither the good nor virtue has any meaning apart
from the ongoing, active participation of real people in ordinary life.
For purposes of a republican politics, then, Aristotelian ethics recon
ciles freedom with virtue and the good by making the good a function
of virtue, virtue a function of the good, and both a function of individ
ual judgment. 137
This definition of the good would be question-begging but for Aris
totle's stipulation that the life well lived is one that serves the ergon of
humankind; one that develops our distinctive rationality. The mean
ing and role of ergon in the Ethics and in this theory of inculpation
will be taken up in Part IV.B., which addresses the charge of perfec
tionism. For now, however, let me dwell a little longer on the idea
that the definition of the good is something in which we are all en
gaged during the ordinary course of our lives.
I began this discussion by asking about our warrant for inculpation
- how we justify an assessment of another's virtue with extraordi
nary consequences like imprisonment and death. That warrant or jus
tification would have to be based on some interest we all claim in the
quality of that person's judgment. Aristotle's understanding of the re
lation between practical reason and the good, in phronesis, gives us
the hint of an answer: if each of us is engaged in defining the good,
!37 Stephen Feldman reaches a similar conclusion in recasting the common good as a
postmodern interpretive concept:
We consequently reunite two components of the civic republican tradition: deliberative
politics and the common good. Only now, we realize that these two components do not
stand tensely opposed, rather they are dialectically linked in a postmodern interpretive
circle. The substantive goal of identifying a common good generates political dialogue,
while the process of political dialogue generates the common good. Process and substance
collapse into each other.
Feldman, supra note 4, at 2281 (citation omitted).
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each of us has an interest in how the others carry out that task. There
are at least two ways to elaborate this thought. In doing so, we will
articulate the interest in others' judgment that grounds inculpation.
We can begin with the unremarkable observation that human be
ings are interdependent. One might say that human society is organic
in that sense, were it not for the fact that there is no social organism
that intelligently or otherwise pursues its own good. Nor is the good
of society immediately apparent, or even determinate, in a way that
enables the members of a society simply to pursue that good. Cer
tainly it is not so obvious or uncontroversial that the good can be dic
tated into collective action. Whatever the need for collective action
our interdependence may seem to impose, the greater good can be
identified and pursued only through instances of individual judgment.
The individual judgments that bear on the greater good are not
only those that concern overtly political questions. Because of our in
terdependence, the good of another or of the whole may be implicated
in any particular decision that any one of us may face. The others
have an unavoidable need, and therefore a reasonable expectation, that
such decisions will be made well, with a cognizance of the wider im
plications of the decision and with both the willingness and the capac
ity to choose the course which best serves the greater good where it is
implicated. We require, in short, that members display a certain
amount of maturity, disinterestedness, and perspicacity in judging
their own actions. The problem of inculpation can be approached as
the task of understanding the quality of judgment that we demand of
all, and that we find lacking in those we deem culpable.
The other way to articulate our legitimate interest in the individual
actor's deliberations on the good is to consider the nature of the per
son. Two views of the person, which are often put in opposition to
one another, are prominent in political theory. The first is the individ
ual of liberal theory: the person supported from the inside. 138 He is an
autonomous being, possessed of a will by which he determines his re
lations to the world around him. He has the capacity for free choice,
for the independent determination of his own ends and for the defini
tion of his own identity. The second view of the person takes society
138 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 227 (1980) ("For
[the liberal,] the overriding fact is that he finds himself among a large number of individuals,
each one of whom affirms his own good . . . . "); RONALD DWORKIN, Why Liberals Should Care
About Equality, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 205, 205 C'[Government] must
impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an argument that the citizen could not
accept without abandoning his sense of equal worth.'1; Mn.L, supra note 3, at 262 ("He who Jets
the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other
faculty than the ape-like one of imitation."); RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 304-rn
(describing a theory of justice premised on individual choice of social institutions employing a
minimal index of primary goods); RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, at 395-99 (explaining the need
for a thin theory of the good in a deontological theory of justice).
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to be constitutive of the self. 139 One's identity is not an irreducible
core of being, but a function of one's relations to the outside world
and to others. I a m what I am by virtue of being raised in this fam
ily, adhering to that religion, living in this neighborhood, and receiving
and affirming that set of philosophical assumptions. Each of these
commitments and communities can be seen as a coordinate, the set of
which defines my place in the world and the contours of my self.
One of these two views of the person is emphasized in various
competing and inconsistent political theories. In themselves, however,
they are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive. On the contrary,
both meet the test of ordinary experience. The person is neither a
purely self-sufficient being nor merely an aspect of society. We push
back against our environment and influences, just as they constantly
press in on us. The person is the temporary product of this ongoing,
dynamic process: a momentary balance in the push from within and
the push from without. In that dialectic, the person is neither sover
eign nor cipher. The person is a participant: discrete but engaged; a
creature of the speech, agreements, symbols, texts, conventions, and
institutions of society, but equally the author of that world of meaning
through her intentional participation in it. 140
139 Foremost among such theories is Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit:
The doctrine which puts Sittlichkeit at the apex of moral life requires a notion of society
as a larger community life . . . in which man participates as a member.
Now this notion displaces the centre of gravity, as it were, from the individual onto the
community, which is seen as the locus of a life or subjectivity, of which the individuals are
phases.
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 378 (1975). Burke strikes a similar note in praising "just prejudice"
and tradition:
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason,
because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do
better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. . . .
Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit, and not a series of unconnected acts. Through
just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 99 (Thomas H.D. Mahoney
ed., 1955) (1790). More recently, Michael Sandel's response to Rawls is in the same vein:
But we cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those
loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them
is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are - as mem
bers of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons
and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982).
140 Again, Feldman makes a similar point in applying postmodern interpretivism to republican
theory:
Postmodern interpretivism reveals that the individual and the community are dialectically
intermingled. Each individual always remains situated within a community and its tradi
tions, which simultaneously enable and constrain one's ability to communicate and interact
- to be, in short, a person. Yet, the community and its traditions continue to exist only
insofar as they constantly are constructed and reconstructed through concrete individual
acts, words, and thoughts.
Feldman, supra note 4, at 2287 (citation omitted).
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It is here that we locate an individual responsibility for defining
the good that can be legitimately enforced by others and that can
serve as a ground for inculpation as a judgment on virtue. If the per
son is defined in an ongoing transaction with the society he occupies,
society is defined in the same transaction. The texts, symbols, and in
stitutions that make up society have a constitutive, transformative ef
fect on its members, but it is no less true that those texts, symbols,
and institutions do not exist apart from the individual members who
occupy, alter, and employ them. Each of us has a transformative, con
stitutive effect on the social world around us. If we define the society
around us as we define ourselves - as we envision the good for our
selves and assemble our own schemes of ends - we bear a responsi
bility to others to conceive and pursue our ends in a way that
promotes the greater good. Defining the good and determining ends
are acts over which we maintain some control and upon which the
well-being of others depends.
The criminal law asserts and enforces that responsibility. Criminal
liability is not imposed because the actions of the defendant fall into a
particular pattern or have a particular result. In the actual adjudica
tion of a criminal case, the focus is not just on the harm done. The
question - made explicit in cases of colorable justification or excuse,
but implicit in every case - is whether the choices the actor made, in
the particular circumstances she faced, reflect sound practical judg
ment in the pursuit of appropriate ends.
B.

Virtue as a Jury Question

One might well ask what "a judgment on virtue" or "an assessment
of virtue" means in the context of a criminal trial. Does phronesis
supply a rule to which conduct must conform? Is the phronimos a
standard, similar to the ubiquitous reasonable person, to which the
jury compares the defendant and his actions? The answer to these
questions is no. But why?
Recall the nature of phronesis. It is a quality of judgment, a qual
ity of the person, not an abstraction about actions. It is not a rule or
a standard. Neither phronesis nor specific judgments made by the
phronimos are reducible to any definite, generally binding formula or
normative idea. The question, then, is how phronesis can serve as a
guide to action or, more to our point, as a guide to judgments about
actions.
The short answer is that the jury decides whether the actor's deci
sion, in its particularity, was the right one under the circumstances. 141
Jurors at trial are presented with the set of circumstances under which
the defendant acted, closely defined by rules of evidence and articu141

I note again_ that I am holding constant exogenous influences on jury deliberations. See

supra note 49.
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lated with as much specificity and concrete particularity as the parties
to the case can muster. In deliberating, each juror decides, ultimately,
whether she would have acted in the same way as the accused under
the given circumstances. That decision is a collaborative one: the
point of assembling a jury is to check the possibly biased, possibly
idiosyncratic, possibly arbitrary judgments of an individual decision
maker, with a view to approximating the community's judgment
about the good .of all. Achieving that approximation is the purpose of
requiring jury unanimity in criminal cases. 142
The judgment the jury makes is not about the actions of the ac
cused, but about the right course of action in the circumstances of the
accused. This distinction is slight but significant. The former decision
is the sort exemplified by the reasonable person standard: a matter of
imposing a template on a course of events, then approving a match or
condemning a discrepancy. The latter decision is itself an exercise of
practical judgment. A comparison is made, to be sure, between the
course of action the jurors would have pursued and the course of ac
tion actually taken by the accused. But the respective terms of that
comparison are particularized practical judgments generated out of the
facts of the situation: the judgment of the accused in the actual event
and the judgment of the jury in the evidentiary reconstruction.
The jury's decision is, ultimately, not a matter of imposing a uni
versal rule on a set of facts. Once we see this, it alters fundamentally
our understanding of inculpation. The decision is not about the
proper distribution of social goods such as bodily integrity and prop
erty; the decision is one about judgment. If, with Aristotle, we take
judgment to be the prime constituent of character, inculpation is, as
we have long suspected, a decision about character. 143
This theory of inculpation explains the most prominent features of
the criminal trial. It accounts for our intense concern with the careful
and orderly presentation of the evidence in ways that are not mislead
ing or biased. It also explains the importance - otherwise suspect as
distorting rhetoric - of essential lawyering skills in a criminal trial:
the importance of creating empathy and a vivid sense of the defend
ant's circumstances, concerns, and perceptions. These features of the
142 See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (holding that a nonunanimous verdict of
a jury of six violates due process and the Sixth Amendment). But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404, 4n (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a unanimous jury of
twelve); Johnson v. Louisiana, 4o6 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (holding that due process does not require
a unanimous jury of twelve).
143 It might be objected that chaiacter evidence is excluded from criminal trials and that there
fore such trials cannot assess chaiacter. See FED. R. Evm. 404. The objection rests in pait on a
misunderstanding of the rule. What the rule excludes is propensity evidence: the admission of
evidence of prior acts to show action in conformity therewith. Even without instances of prior
behavior to rely on, however, the jury can assess the judgment displayed by the accused in the
circumstances of the offense and the adequacy and appropriateness of the scheme of ends implicit
in her action. No "chaiacter evidence" of any description is needed to make such an assessment.
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criminal trial, like jury unanimity, simply make more sense if we think
of the trial as an exercise in which the jury members assess the judg
ment of the accused by comparing her responses and choices to their
own in light of her circumstances. 144
In this light, the institution of the jury itself takes on an added
dimension. The jury is not merely a fair or democratic means of ar
riving at a decision that could be reached equally well by a judge or
by any bystander trained in the applicable law. The jury is an organic
part of the judgment itself. The decision the jury is asked to make is
not whether the facts fall into a particular pattern that leads to incul
pation, excuse, or justification. The question is not viewed from the
legislator's perspective but at the level of the accused herself. In actu
ally adjudicating the case, we engage in an explicitly communal exer
cise in which peers of the actor are placed in a carefully designed and
controlled situation in which a set of circumstances is laid out before
them in concrete terms. The jury then applies its own collective judg
ment to the question of the appropriate course of action, and in that
way determines whether the accused chose his course of action cor
rectly. In that sense the jury is a vital part of criminal adjudication.
The judgment on inculpation is not one that can be reached other
than by means of a jury. 145
This view of inculpation and the jury is open to several objections.
It seems wrong to say that inculpation is not a matter of imposing
rules on a set of facts. The jury has its instructions which contain, at
a minimum, the prohibitions of a criminal code. Those instructions
are assembled by a judge, who may well disallow certain defenses. It
appears the jvry's decision is by no means the free-ranging, particular144 Given the degree to which such a jury decision is embedded in the concrete circumstances
and actions of the defendant, there should be no fear that my theory would sanction "thought
crimes." We do not punish intentions; some bad act is required. See I LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra
note 17, §3.2, at 272; see also LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND Gun.TY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE
CR1M1NAL LAW 153 (1987) (citing reasons such as the impossibility of enforcing such prohibitions,
universal criminalization resulting from every person's occasional bad thoughts, the impossibility
of grading such crimes by their seriousness or severity, and the oppressive effect on mental life
generally).
The theory advanced here premises inculpation on practical judgment and virtue, but in Aris
totle's theory, neither practical judgment nor virtue can be exercised in the abstract. Phronesis
issues in action, not in thought. See infra pp. 1467--08.
145 This is not to say that criminal bench trials are illegitimate. The organic connection be
tween inculpation and the institution of the jury helps to explain the constitutional presumption
of jury trials in criminal cases, see U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI, even where the
defendant wishes to waive that right, see Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965). The
connection also explains the value placed on jury trials historically. Against that historical and
constitutional background, the criminal bench trial can only be seen as a surrogate for the jury a "jury of one." At the defendant's option, the judge may hear the same evidence in the same
controlled fashion as the jury. The judgment he makes will be the same as the jury's: whether
the accused's actions display sound practical judgment in the pursuit of appropriate ends. Bench
trials would contradict the point I make only if they were on a level, historically and constitution
ally, with jury trials.

1995]

VIRTUE AND INCULPATION

ized, context-sensitive assessment of practical judgment that I have
suggested. On the contrary, the jury's decision seems to be very much
a matter of imposing a template on events. Juries do, after all, apply
the reasonable person standard in cases of criminal negligence - and
similar templates in other cases.
These objections mistake the level at which my theory addresses
the criminal law. I am not concerned in the first instance with indi
vidual doctrines, offenses, elements, or standards, but with the under
lying rationale of the whole. I am, as I stated at the outset, concerned
with the justifying subtext of the law. Consequently, to say that
phronesis lies behind the deliberations of the jury is not to imply that
that idea must appear in the jury's instructions, or that accepted legal
standards like the reasonable person can no longer be employed. The
point is that an Aristotelian virtue ethics can be located beneath our
practice.
A second answer to the objection concerns our view of the instruc
tions themselves. The jury may not have a free hand under its in
structions to make an independent assessment of the defendant's
practical judgment. Does that mean, however, that the criminal law
operates under a system of universal rules that subsume particular
cases regardless of questions of individual judgment? Or is there an
other way of understanding the rules themselves that will put the
question of practical judgment foremost?
In life, the phronimos himself does not proceed every step of the
way making highly particularized decisions - that would be impossi
ble. He must generalize from past experience. Thus it is that the rec
ognized virtues retain their status in Aristotle's Ethics. 146 Those
established virtues can be seen as rules: "We reflect that courage is an
important human virtue; this serves as a 'rule' to guide our delibera
tion in particular situations. . . . All this is uncontroversial; and if
Aristotle's account had made no room for universal major premises,
we would think there was something wrong with it." 147
These "rules" are not, however, the binding universals of a moral
code. Aristotelian virtue ethics is fundamentally different from a mo
rality of duty or obligation. The virtuous person does what is right in
the circumstances she faces as an expression of character - not in
order to comply with a prescribed moral duty. In an ethics of virtue,
one "might try to derive some judgments or rules about what is right,
wrong, or obligatory from its basic ideals of virtue, but these basic
ideals must themselves not be judgments or principles about what is
right, wrong, or obligatory. They must be ideals about what is virtu-

146 See IRWIN, supra note 67, § 241, at
147 NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 198.

439.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

108:1423

ous."148 Because phronesis is indeterminate, any such "rules" would be
as context-sensitive as virtue itself.
We should understand the prohibitions and defenses of the criminal
law in this way. To begin with, we do instruct juries. We do not
mechanically hold persons to account against a rigid code. We employ
juries because we place the person prior to the rule, because we are
sensitive to the possibility that none of the rules may be adequate to
describe justice in the given situation, and because the rules may con
flict in a way that only human hands can unravel. We allow juries to
nullify their instructions, for example, because we accept the possibil
ity that the rules may fail to do justice in the individual case - may,
that is, conflict with the jury's judgment about the appropriate course
of action in the defendant's circumstances.
This sensitivity to the particular over the universal extends to the
law that juries receive in their instructions. The criminal law is not a
system of objectively valid rules or universally applicable standards.
We are mistaken if we view it as a vast system of social control designed, constructed, and governed from above. The criminal law is
a set of accrued communal judgments about recurring situations and
frequently confronted choices. By and large the product of common
law development, the criminal law is strongly analogous to the
phronimos 's acquired guides to action. The law resembles and to a
degree reflects the accepted virtues that concerned Aristotle, at least in
the sense of having been generated out of the particulars of experience.
In short, the law of the jury's instructions, as well as the jury's
particular decision, is grounded in phronesis. In the hard case, the
jury acts as I have described it above: each member comparing the
accused's choices with what she believes her own would be in the sit
uation of the accused. Even in the easy case, however - the con
fessed premeditated homicide - phronesis is implicit in the very rules
that speed the case to its foregone conclusion. 149
This point indicates again the descriptive nature of my theory. To
say that a jury verdict's turning on phronesis is different from a jury's
application of the reasonable person standard is not to suggest that the
reasonable person standard ought to be discarded. My argument is
that phronesis undergirds the reasonable person standard; that the rea148 William K. Frankena, Prichard and the Ethics of Virtue, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORALITY:
ESSAYS BY WILLIAM K. FRANKENA 152 (K.E. Goodpaster ed., 1976).
149 The fact that such a case would likely be decided by a plea bargain is irrelevant. What
drives the plea bargain is the threat of a guilty verdict, however that may be understood. If we
understand guilty verdicts as an assessment of virtue, a plea-bargained case is no less the result of
an assessment of virtue than any other outcome.
The same can be said for cases in which the issue at trial is peripheral to the defendant's
judgment - for example, cases of identity. If it pursues a defense of identity, the defense effec
tively concedes the wrongfulness of the action. If the wrongfulness of the action is understood as
a matter of defective practical judgment, the identity case, too, involves an assessment of virtue.

..

1995]

VIRTUE AND INCULPAT/ON

sonable person standard is but a particular expression of a value that
lies beneath all the criminal law: sound practical judgment or, in a
word, virtue. 150
C.

lnculpatio n as a Judgment o n Virtue and
the Charge of Perfectionism

To say that our warrant for blaming and punishing an actor de
rives from an obligation to pursue appropriate ends by reasoning cor
rectly suggests that we are engaged in perfectionism: that the
punishing majority is using its coercive powers to conform the conduct
of the individual to ends which are not her own and to a vision of the
good which she might not share. However, much of the sting can be
taken out of the charge of perfectionism if we recall the indeterminate
nature of Aristotelian virtue.
Phro nesis has nothing to do with obeying a rule given by others.
Sound individual judgment, not conformity, is the mark of virtue.
Phro nesis is a quality of practical judgment that enables one to act
amid the contingencies of everyday life with a constant orientation to
ward the good - doing so not in order to conform or only out of a
deep understanding of the propriety of one's action, but because the
proper action springs from the core of one's character. According to
Aristotle, virtue is manifested only in action - one cannot be virtuous
in the abstract or in one's thoughts. 151 Nor can the right choice in any
given situation be determined in advance by means of contemplation
alone. Virtue cannot be dictated, except in bare outline. 152 Phronesis
neither relies on nor produces determinate rules.
This indeterminacy extends to the good that virtue serves. Cer
tainly we begin with inherited notions of the good and the right. Pre
cisely because they come to us as determinate rules, however, they
cannot constitute genuine virtue. Aristotle insists that true virtue is
ISO A comprehensive reformulation of the criminal Jaw can only be hinted at here, but I sus
pect that, at any stage of the criminal case, the decision at hand can be expressed in terms of
practical judgment rather than of distributive justice and thus as a question of virtue rather than
of harm alone. For example, a court may refuse to submit a proffered defense to the jury either
because it is not recognized - such as intoxication in a case of recklessness or a mistake of law
- or because a recognized defense is not supported by the evidence. Each of those rules and
decisions can be restated in terms of assessing practical j udgment. One can say that the good of
all is not served by a person's choosing to become so intoxicated that he cannot deliberate or
choose. One can say that the law is in deep accord with sound practical judgment, so that ex
plicit notice of the demands of the criminal law is not required by justice. One can say that the
defense of provocation cannot be considered in a case of a parent's killing one who has molested
his child, not because it would set a precedent that would lead to retribution and anarchy, but
because the actor should know and act on that principle himself, as one possessed of sound judg
ment and as a conscientious and reflective member of society.
ISi See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at II.4.uo5 b.
1s2 See id. at X.9.u81b.
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pursued for its own s�ke. 153 The virtuous person does not choose the
good for any reason. The good is for her a direct expression of deeply
held, well-examined convictions. This process of critically examining,
internalizing, and acting on the good creates a dialectic. The good is
not only the object of virtue; it is defined in the process of living a
virtuous life. The good is not a given, known quantity, but the prod
uct of a life of sound practical judgment characterized by a fixed dis
position to pursue the good - the life of the phronimos .
The indeterminacy of Aristotelian virtue and the good serves as an
adequate response to the charge of perfectionism, so far as it goes.
Demanding another's conformity to a rule leaves one open to the
charge of perfectionism; demanding that others exercise mature, con
scientious judgment in pursuing their ends does not. One problem is
immediately apparent, however. li phronesis and the good are defined
in a reciprocal, dialectical relationship, what exactly does virtue re
quire? The relationship between virtue and the good appears to be
circular and empty: if the phronimos both pursues and defines the
good, the good is whatever the phronimos happens to posit as his end.
Answering that objection gives us a more adequate response to the
charge of perfectionism.
Recall that Aristotle claims humans have an. ergon, a distinctive
function. 154 In distinguishing humans from plants and lower animals,
Aristotle claims that humans have the distinctive capacity to form
wishes and desires and to organize their actions with regard to these
attributes. 155 Furthermore, humans have the ability to view their lives
as a whole. Humans ordinarily sort their wishes and desires into or
dered schemes, and do so on the basis of a life over time. 156 Our
wishes and desires can be random and ephemeral, but we regard that
condition as unusual, as less than we are capable of, as foolish. 157 It is
part of the distinctive rationality of humans that we are capable of
conceiving of a final, comprehensive good into which our current
wishes and desires are incorporated. 158
Human excellence, for Aristotle, is excellence in this process of con
structing a whole, ordered life. 159 The life well lived is one that draws
upon and develops one's human capacities. 160 Phronesis, the excel
lence of practical judgment that is the mark of the virtuous person,
drives and exemplifies such a life. And such a life is the good. The
good, for Aristotle, is not goods in the consumer sense, nor the good as
153 See id. at Il.4.r ro5a; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 181, at 341.
1 54 See ARISTOTLE, supra note S, at l.7.1098a.
155 See id. at m.2.ur rb, 1u3a.
156 See id. at l.7.1098a.

157 See
158 See

id.
id.
1 59 See id.
160 See id.

at X.3.rr 74a.
at Vl.5.u4oa.
at VI.13.u44b--u45a, IX.8.u69a.
at X.3.u74a, IX.9.u69b--u7oa; IRWIN, supra note 67, § 2,17, at 405--06.
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a superhuman ideal, nor in any sense what is good for human beings.
It is rather the good in humans: that which can be made the leading
principle of life so as to lead to an end or purpose needing no further
justification. The good is the fulfillment of distinctively human pur
poses - rationality in actio·n. 161
The ergon argument breaks the apparent circularity between the
good and the phronimos: both are defined by reference to rationality
itself. More important for our purposes, the ergon argument also
serves to answer the charge of perfectionism. Aristotelian ethics asks
the individual to heed his rational nature, to cultivate the quality of
judgment that serves his own highest ends. It asks him to construct a
whole life: a life that draws fully on his human capacities. That de
mand has a weight and content, but nothing that reduces the person
to an instrument of another or to a vessel of others' meaning. 1 62
The critical link to inculpation is the fact that as a person con
structs such a life, because of human interdependence, he will be par
ticipating in the dialectic which defines the good of society. The
institution of inculpation is our demand that he participate conscien
tiously. If the self and society are viewed as mutually constitutive as even the leading voices of liberalism do not deny163 - participation
in defining one's society, including the ends of that society, is a given.
The demand implicit in inculpation is nothing more than the minimal
demand that one's participation in an enterprise that is a necessary
and inescapable part of the human condition be carried out with a due
regard for, and with the constant, conscientious employment of, the
rationality that defines that condition. The criminal law demands that
this constitutive role be carried out so as to express one's distinctive
nature as a rational being. Surely among thin theories of the good,
that is acceptably lean.
D.

Defeating the Determinist's Defense

Fletcher acknowledges Aristotle's Ethics as a possible framework
for understanding the role of character in inculpation, but he immedi
ately dismisses it. The reason he does so has nothing to do with
perfectionism. Fletcher rejects the Ethics in favor of simple voluntari
ness as a key to excuse because he finds the Ethics and his own the
ory of excuse as a matter of character especially vulnerable to the logic
of determinism: "it is difficult to maintain that all our vices are traceaSee ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at I.7.1098a.
As Martha Nussbaum argues, such a view of human good implies that "[t]ruly political
associations - the ones that respect autonomy - are not just peripheral but necessary to human
good living." Martha C. Nussbaum, Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criti
cism of Plato, in ESSAYS, supra note 93, at 395, 419. Furthermore, the good that appears at the
center of this republican theory of inculpation is a component of Rawls's thin theory of the good,
providing a key motive in the original position. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 2, at 424.
163 See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 2 , at 41.
161

162
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ble to prior acts of choice and that therefore character is ultimately
linked to a way of life we are free to perpetuate or reject." 164 Fletcher
cites Book Il of the Nicho machean Ethics, 165 but the canonical text is
at Book ill, chapter five - the point at which Aristotle confronts the
question of determinism versus responsibility most directly. He writes
there that "virtue or excellence depends on ourselves, and so does
vice,"166 and that:
The saying, "No one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily happy,"
seems to be partly false and partly true. That no one is involuntarily
happy is true, but wickedness is voluntary. If we do not accept that, we
must contradict the conclusions at which we have just arrived, and must
deny that man is the source and begetter of his actions as a father is of
his children. But if our conclusions are accepted, and if we cannot trace
back our actions to starting points other than those within ourselves,
then all actions in which the initiative lies in ourselves are in our power
and are voluntary actions.
These conclusions are corroborated by the judgment of individuals and
by the practice of lawgivers. 167

It is as true now as it was in Aristotle's time that lawgivers consider
our actions voluntary when they cannot be traced to causes other than
ourselves. Nevertheless, that assumption hardly establishes that a
wicked character is voluntary, or (Aristotle's larger point) that we are
responsible for the wicked acts that arise from a bad character. If
anything, it is the lawgivers' assumption that needs support.
The key to Aristotle's reply to the determinist is to recognize how
the determinist's defense relies not only on the determined nature of
human action, but also on the contingent nature of human life. The
determinist's argument is that to impose responsibility where there is
no opportunity to act otherwise is unjust. I have no control over the
influences that shape my character or my actions. Those influences
operate at the beginning of life, in the circumstances of my family, and
in the competence of my parents. No one has any control over where
and how I will start life. The real sting of the determinist's defense,
then, is that responsibility is imposed arbitrarily, because each person's
lot in life is assigned at random. 168 The determinist's defense thus
depends on the contingent as well as the determined nature of human
life.
The question is whether that kind of contingency is relevant to
moral and legal judgments. Everything about our world is arbitrary
in the same sense, down to all basic physical existence. The Big Bang
164 FLETCHER, supra note 13, § ro.3.2, at 805.
165 See id. at 805 n.r3.
166 ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at ill.5.rrr3b.
167 Id.
168 "[I]t is time - long past time - to confront the relationship between crime and the acci
dent of birth." Bazelon, supra note 53, at 405.
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might have had different ripples than it did. Moral and legal judg
ments, however, are a means of coping with the here and now. Such
judgments ta}{e for granted an entire universe that might have been
different, but is not. There is nitrogen, dogs bark, we feel gravity's
pull - an infinite number of things are arbitrary in an ultimate sense
but matter to moral and legal judgments only as the non-controversial
framework within which those judgments are made.
The question is where we draw the line between background con
ditions and foreground contingencies - with only the latter directly
relevant to the moral or legal judgment at hand. With regard to incul
pation, the determinist places the line farther back in the personal his
tory of the accused than would one who affirms existing judgments
about criminal responsibility. The determinist takes into account ear
lier environmental factors that traditionally have been excluded from
consideration.
The determinist, however, does not and cannot place the marker
all the way back. Any moral or legal judgment assumes some back
ground. There is a given, whether we think of it as hard fact or her
meneutics, within which the personal history and the conversation
about responsibility makes sense. There is a world in which human
beings, working with limited capacities and abilities, are confronted
with a familiar set of moral problems. And now, even more than in
Aristotle's time, we have a well-established set of answers that are de
fensible as considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. 169
The effect of recognizing the determinist's reliance on contingency
is not to refute his argument but to shift the burden. The question is
not whether we consider the background conditions of the crime but
how much of the background we consider. We need to ask not why
we place the marker between the given and the meaningfully contin
gent where we do but why we should place it elsewhere. So when
Aristotle places the marker well forward - arguing that one is re
sponsible for one's own character and the acts that spring from it he appeals to everyday judgment and the practice of legislators.
Aristotle's point in Book ID, chapter 5 is that we may begin with
inherited capacities and dispositions, but that later we begin to make
choices that shape those capacities and dispositions into a character. 170
My choices are indeed determined by the circumstances in which I
supra note 2, at 20 (citing NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND
65--68 (1955)).
110 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5 1 at m.5.n14b--n15a; see also M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on
Learning to Be Good, in ESSAYS, supra note 93, at 69, So ("[I]n the fully developed man of virtue
and practical wisdom [pre-rational responses] have become integrated with, indeed they are now
infused and corrected by, his reasoned scheme of values."); T.H. Irwin, Reason and Responsibility
in Aristotle, in ESSAYS, supra note 93, at n7, 141 ("Vice requires the agreement of someone's
rational and nonrational desires. Someone may be incapable of changing his nonrational desires
but still capable of changing his rational desires by deliberation . . . .").
169

See
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begin, but at some point the connection between my origins and my
present self is so attenuated that my starting point falls into the back
ground. My original circumstances become the given - no different
from my language, my society's institutions, or· the scientific or reli
gious paradigms of my time and place. At that point my origins drop
out of the question of responsibility. The more recent influences on
my character, on the other hand, are the products of my particular
choices - of associates, of acquired tastes and acquired vices, of a
style of living, of a habitual regard or disregard for others' welfare. I
have made those choices - not in an ultimate sense, but in the only
sense that is morally relevant - and can fairly be held accountable
for them and for the person those choices have produced. My arrival
at a point at which my character and circumstances are such that I
commit a criminal act is not a random occurrence, is not beyond my
control, and is not an arbitrary basis of responsibility.
Without the charge of arbitrariness, the determinist's defense loses
its sting. To say that my criminal act is determined ultimately by fac
tors in my personal history is little more than a statement of the
human situation. My criminal act is determined no less and in the
same sense by the physical environment, my framework of language,
and the philosophical and scientific suppositions of my time. The con
nection between each of these influences and my criminal act is real,
but so attenuated as to be irrelevant to the more immediate question
of moral or legal responsibility. My origins are, likewise, simply part
of the basic, background conditions which frame, rather than answer,
such questions.

V.

THE BORDERS OF lNCULPATION

To examine the outer reaches of a concept can, on occasion, serve
to enlighten us about its center. On that assumption, I will consider
three issues at the borders of inculpation. The first concerns the inflic
tion of harm where there is no consciousness of doing harm - crimi
nal negligence. I argue that criminal negligence is genuinely
inculpatory and not merely a form of strict liability. A second set of
border cases - attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies - are uncon
troversially inculpatory, but that is precisely why I find them interest
ing. The leading rationale for punishing inchoate offenses is
customarily stated in terms of virtue ethics. Finally, I take up the
problem of omissions, emphasizing the case of the Bad Samaritan. I
conclude that if the criminal law is premised on an ethics of virtue,
the search for a "duty to rescue" which will bring the Bad Samaritan
within the scope of the criminal law is unnecessary and fundamentally
misguided. Omissions can be inculpatory in and of themselves, with
out the necessity of a mediating duty.
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Negligenc e A s an lnculpatory Basis of Criminal Liab ility

Not everyone who is criminally liable is culpable; some are held
liable though they have acted without fault and without drawing our
blame. In areas such as food and drug law and highway safety, strict
liability is imposed. 1 7 1 The grounds and validity of strict liability have
been ably and amply discussed elsewhere and do not concern us
here. 1 7 2 The only point to be made here is that strict liability defines
the outer boundary of inculpation.
There is, however, a dispute over that border which does interest
us. Some commentators have argued that criminal negligence entails
liability without fault, that criminal negligence is indistinguishable
from strict liability, and that therefore recklessness, a conscious disre
gard of risk, is the outer boundary of inculpation. 1 7 3 Larry Alexander
has advanced the argument against negligence as inculpation in an ar
ticle 1 7 4 drawing heavily on Mark Kelman 's Interpretive Co nstruction
in the Substantive Criminal Law. 175 Alexander's argument takes aim
at the reasonable person construct that is central to any conception of
negligence. He asserts that the construct collapses negligence into
either strict liability or recklessness. 1 7 6 At one extreme, if the reason
able person were "appraised [sic] of all the facts about the world that
bore on a correct moral decision," the person would recognize the risk
and take all steps necessary to avert it. 1 7 7 In the event of harm, any
liability imposed would be strict liability. At the other extreme, if the
reasonable person had exactly the same beliefs as the defendant, the
reasonable person "will always act as the defendant acted [thus imply
ing no liability] where the defendant is not conscious of the risk, and
will act differently [implying liability] only where the defendant is con
scious of the risk, i.e. reckless." 1 7 8 Alexander then argues that any rea
sonable person is an arbitrary construct. 1 7 9 He concludes:
"Recklessness is the lowest form of actual culpability, whereas negli
gence is just an arbitrarily drawn subcategory of strict liability."180
1 71 See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 17, § 3.8, at 340 n.I.
112 See, e.g., Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: Ill - The Rise and Fall of
Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REv. 337 passim (1989).
173 See Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 CoLUM.
L. REV. 632, 635-43 (1963).
1 74 See Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 84, 85.
175 See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 591, 600-42 (1981) (arguing that unconsciously applied interpretive constructs determine the
outcome in criminal cases).
1 76 See Alexander, supra note 174, at 85.
1 77 Id. at 98.
178 Id. at 99.
179 See id.
180 Id. at 101

(citation omitted).
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The flaw in this argument was identified thirty or more years ago
by H.L.A. Hart: it erroneously takes negligence to be a psychological
state of mind rather than a public standard of conduct. 181 Alexander
evidently rejects the validity of that standard of conduct, but his rea
sons for doing so, like Kelman's, are highly questionable. 182 The rea
sonable person standard is hardly an arbitrary construct. It is a
hermeneutic construct neither different in kind nor ontologically infer
ior to the facts of the case or the psychological state of the actor. 183
l8l See H.L.A. HART, Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHM ENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136, 149 (1968).
182 Alexander appears to follow Kelman in denying the validity of normative judgments gener
ally. See Alexander, supra note 174, at 101 ("The concept of the [reasonable person] . . . is a
morally arbitrary and morally empty construct.'l The idea that a clear line separates facts from
normative judgments, or "values," had a brief life in Western philosophy, as a feature of a promi
nent British interpretation of logical positivism. See ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND
LOGIC 38-39 (2d ed. 1950). The various branches of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) Movement
have resorted to structuralist and deconstructive literary techniques to attack the distinction be
tween fa.ct and value, and well recognize its untenability. See Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism
and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 136 n.15 (1984); Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of
Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 579, 581-86
(1987); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1169-70 (1985);
David M. 'Irubek, Where the Action ls: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv.
5 75, 580 (1984). However, CLS scholars have consistently proceeded to the (much less than neces
sary) inference - drawn by the Frankfurt School, Althusser, and Luka.cs before them - that
therefore both "the facts" and values are the morally arbitrary, self-serving imposition of a ruling
class. See Heller, supra, at 163-72; Kelman, supra, at 633; Peller, supra, at 127 1- 74; 'Irubek,
supra, at 588--95; see also PAUL HIRST, ON LAW AND IDEOLOGY 40-42 (1979) (summarizing Louis
Althusser's theory of ideological state apparatuses); Istvan Mesz-aros, Lukacs Concept of Dialec
tic, in GEORG LUKACS 34, 44-54 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed., 1977) (summarizing Luka.cs' theory of
class consciousness). Those scholars, no less than the "positivists" they attack, deny the possibility
of valid, broadly binding normative judgments. Kelman's article, on which Alexander's is based,
is a prime example of such denial. See, e.g. , Kelman, supra note 175, at 597 ("The 'victory' of
one framework or the other is a temporary one that can never be made with assurance or com
fort. Ea.ch assertion manifests no more than a momentary expression of feelings that remain con
tradictory and unresolved.'�.
183 To follow just one possible line of argument, Richard Rorty's neo-pragmatist view is that a
fa.ct is a creature of social practice, of hermeneutics:
We will not be able to isolate basic elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of
the whole fabric within which these elements occur. Thus we will not be able to substitute
the notion of "accurate representation" (element-by-element) for that of successful accom
plishment of a practice. Our choice of elements will be dictated by our understanding of
the practice, rather than the practice's being "legitimated" by a "rational reconstruction"
out of elements. This holist line of argument says that we shall never be able to avoid the
"hermeneutic circle" - the fa.ct that we cannot understand the parts of a strange culture,
practice, theory, language, or whatever, unless we know something about how the whole
thing works, whereas we cannot get a grasp on how the whole thing works until we have
some understanding of its parts.
RICHAR D RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 319 (1979). If this is what we
mean by "fa.ct," the fact/value distinction simply dissolves: the normative judgments so disparaged
by Ayer's heirs have at least that much footing in the world. They are meaningful not as point
for-point representations of things called "values" out there in the world, but as practice, as inter
pretive constructs with an independent viability and validity within the life of a society.
Neo-pragrnatism can be said to have begun with Quine's demolition of British logical positiv
ism in the 1950s. See WILLARD V.O. QUINE, 1wo Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL
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The reasonable person standard is but a particular expression of the
demand implicit in all inculpation: in the conduct of one's affairs, one
must exercise sound practical judgment. Far from a variety of strict
liability, negligence is as thoroughly inculpatory as any other category
of mens rea.
This analysis inverts the ordinary understanding of culpable negli
gence as a derivative, impoverished variety of intentional action. RA.
Duff, for example, frames the problem as a question of how to extend
the paradigm of intentional action to reach criminal negligence. 184 He
solves the problem so framed by limiting liability for negligence to
those who could have avoided the harm. 185 This response to the prob
lem, however, does not address Alexander's point: if the actor is una
ware of the harm risked, as she is by definition in a case of negligence,
then she cannot conform her conduct so as to avoid it. It will never
be the case that she could and should have avoided causing the harm,
and all such liability will be strict liability.
The knot in this conundrum is the focus on harm. Both Duff and
Alexander treat the problem of inculpatory negligence as one of the
actor's mental posture toward the harm risked in the offense. That
may well be how we define mens rea for purposes of proof, but to
confine ourselves to that issue in our attempt to understand inculpa
tion is both unnecessary and self-defeating. Inculpation is a broader
question than mens rea, and we can justify negligence as inculpatory
liability even if the actor is conceded to be unaware of the harm or the
risk at the time she engages in her inculpating behavior. The reason is
that the responsibility on which inculpation is premised is broader
than the responsibility to avoid harm.
The question of the good is neither an abstract problem nor a
question one takes up at leisure. If the self and society are mutually
constitutive, one is inevitably, constantly, and inextricably involved in
defining the good for oneself and others. If we are the authors of sociPOINT OF VIEW 20, 42-43 (1953); see also w.v. Quine, Ontological Relativity, in ONTOLOGICAL
RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 47-51 (1969).
Of course, Continental hermeneutics, especially Gadamer's, also undermine Alexander's and
Kelman's Ayerian assumptions. See, e.g. , Feldman, supra note 4, at 2248-49; Hans-Georg
Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS
128, 133 (Josef Bleicher ed. & trans., 1980).
184 See R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.3, at 154-57 (1990).
185 Duff writes:
If she could not have attained that standard [of care], to convict her would be to hold her
strictly (and unjustly) liable for what she could not help. But if she could have attained
that standard; if she failed to take reasonable care, not because she lacked the capacity to
do so, but because she failed to exercise capacities for thought and attention which she
could (and should) have exercised: then to convict her of negligence is to hold her properly
liable for what she could and should have helped. . . . Negligence can thus be defined as a
genuine species of culpable fault.
Id. at 156.
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ety in every decision and in each act, we have a responsibility to de
velop the deep and perspicacious judgment that not only will get us
by in the world, but also will define the good with a full regard for
our, and others ', rationality. Inculpation is premised on that responsi
bility for the good, not on the more narrow responsibility to avoid
harm. One can therefore act culpably while being unaware of the par
ticular risk one has created. 186

B.

Inchoate Offenses and the Requirements of Virtue

We have examined the case of harm with no intent: the genuinely
inculpatory nature of criminal liability when there is not even a con
sciousness of possible harm. What of the other border case, the case
of intent with no harm? Does the law on inchoate offenses support or
illuminate the theory advanced here? It does. The logic of virtue eth
ics permeates the law of inchoate offenses.
Solicitations, attempts, and conspiracies consist of illicit intentions
combined with enough of an act to confirm the intention, but no
harm. 187 Several justifications have been advanced for inflicting pun
ishment in the absence of harm. One is the fortuity argument: the
offender should not escape justice when harm has been averted or
failed to materialize in spite of his best efforts. 188 Another is the claim
that criminalizing inchoate offenses gives law enforcement a margin of
error, a capacity to stop crime before anyone is hurt. 189 The third
major argument, however, is the most compelling and the most inter
esting for our purposes:
Conduct designed to cause or culminate in the commission of a crime
obviously yields an indication that the actor is disposed towards such
activity, not alone on this occasion but on others. There is a need, there
fore, subject again to proper safeguards, for a legal basis upon which the
special danger that such individuals present may be assessed and dealt
with. They must be made amenable to the corrective process that the
Jaw provides. 190
186 This conclusion raises the question whether a person who acts negligently, but who fortui
tously causes no harm, is liable under the criminal law.
This question is not peculiar to my theory of criminal negligence. Generally, the lucky risk
taker is not liable, and many have long been troubled by this rule. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 17, § 6.2(b), at 26-28. This is especially true if one considers that, in the case of
knowing or intentional action, the fortuity of a wrong-doer's not causing harm is one of the
principal reasons why we do impose liability for attempts. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5m intro
duction (1985).
My theory supports imposing liability only in that it solidifies one of the basic rationales for
punishing inchoate offenses, of which this offense is a type. See infra Part V.B.
187 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.oI introduction (1985).
188 See id.
189 See id.
1 90 /d. ; see also id. § 5.05 cmt. 1(b) (noting that most statutes provided lesser punishments for
attempts than for completed crimes, but that some states actually did the reverse).
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The same concern arises with respect to more particular issues,
such as the act required to complete an attempt. Some minimal act is
required because we do not punish bad intentions alone. 191 The lead
ing formula for the act requirement, however, looks directly back to
the offender's illicit intent. Liability for an inchoate offense under the
Model Penal Code requires an act or omission constituting a substan
tial step toward commission of the crime. 192 A substantial step, in
turn, is an act or omission "strongly corroborative of the actor's crimi
nal purpose. " 193 Thus, the act requirement too is satisfied by proof of
a dangerous disposition. An earlier formulation of the act requirement
is even more clearly premised on a concern over the offender's danger
ous disposition. A number of courts have held that an act is sufficient
to complete an attempt when it goes beyond the point at which a law
abiding person would desist. 194 One who takes his plans beyond that
point is a dangerous person and may be punished for that, regardless
of whether he succeeds in doing harm. 195
In each of these policies and rationales, we can discern an Aristote
lian theory of inculpation. As I have argued above, the question of
practical judgment arises even in cases of clear liability. In all crimes,
not just those with an arguable excuse or justification, the offender
has formulated an inappropriate system of ends or pursued his ends
by inappropriate means, and we condemn him for that failure. What
is significant in the logic of inchoate offenses is the explicit appeal to
the pattern of such judgments and their source in the offender's char
acter. Inculpation is based expressly on the disposition of the actor,
rather than on the disposition implicit in the harm done. 196
Furthermore, the inchoate offenses bring out the distinction be
tween an ethics of virtue and an ethics of moral duties. As noted
above in Part IV.B., a virtue ethics such as Aristotle's does not preSee I LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 17, § 3.2, at 272.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.oi(1Xc) (1985).
Id. at § 5.oi(2); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.32(3) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring acts that
"demonstrate unequivocally under all the circumstances, that the actor formed that intent and
would commit the crime except for the intervention of another person or some extraneous
factor.").
!94 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.oi cmt. 2 (1985) (referring to courts' requirement of unlawful
purpose); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 17, § 6.2(dX2), at 34; Robert H. Skilton, The Requisite
Act in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PITT. L. REv. 308, 310 (1937).
!95 In the area of solicitation, there are signs of an even broader concern with character. Some
commentators have argued that the law serves the purpose of protecting the public from induce
ments that might offend them or lead them astray. The inducement is harmful in and of itself:
"the solicitor has engaged in irreparably harmful conduct in implanting the suggestion of criminal
ity in the mind of another." Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
1469, 1515 (1964). The harm in a solicitation is a corrupting effect on the character of another in
addition to the dangerous disposition of the solicitor himself.
196 It is worth noting again that, because it looks to the the disposition implicit in the harm
done or in the substantial step, my theory does not condone punishing thoughts. See supra note
144,
191
192
193

...
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scribe discrete moral duties. Rather than imposing obligations to do
certain things, Aristotle argues that one should be a certain kind of
person. I have argued that juries in criminal cases make a more fine
grained determination than their instructions alone suggest. They are
deciding a question of practical judgment and virtue, not just whether
the accused has complied with his legal duties.
Inchoate offenses are notable in bringing this distinction between
disposition and duty to the fore. Although we may think of a criminal
prohibition as a duty not to do a particular harm, the fact is that we
punish even when no such duty has been violated, usually with the
same severity as if it had been. We punish the disposition to do the
act. What is more, the disposition we punish for is a dangerous dispo
sition in general, not a disposition to do a particular act. Courts and
commentators frequently note the prophylactic effect of inchoate liabil
ity in preventing future crimes by the same actor. 197
In its focus on dispositions rather than violated duties, the law of
inchoate offenses reflects a virtue ethics akin to Aristotle's rather than
a morality of conventional duties and conformity. If virtue is our con
cern when no harm is done, there is reason to believe it remains our
concern when the harm is done. In all cases, not just in inchoate of
fenses, we are concerned with the choices the actor makes and the
ends he gives himself. In all cases, inculpation is a judgment on
virtue.
C.

Omiss io ns, the S earch for Duties, and Virtue Ethics

Suppose I come upon a drunk face down in a puddle. He will die
if I do not turn him over. I walk on, because as a lawyer I know that
I will not be held responsible for his death. It is black-letter law that
criminal liability is not imposed for omissions. 198 Liability is found
only if a duty can be identified, anq I have no duty to a stranger in
peril if I have not created the peril.1 99 This case, often called the Bad
Samaritan, is not necessarily representative of the law of omissions.
The criminal law does impose duties to act in a wide variety of cir
cumstances. 200 Nevertheless, the pattern of the law's evolution in this
area has been a grudging incorporation of relatively uncontroversial
moral duties into the realm of inculpating legal duties . 201
See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 17, § 6.2, at 23.
The exception would be crimes that are specifically defined in terms of failing to act, for
example, failing to file a tax return, or failing to stop after a traffic accident. See 1 id. § 3 .3(a), at
283.
199 See id. at 284.
200 Id. §J.3(aX1}-(7), at 284-89 (describing duties based on relationship, statute, contract, vol
untary assumption of care, creation of the peril, control over others, and ownership of land).
201 See Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE LJ. 590, 614- 15 (1958) ("[N]o sufficient
awareness has yet developed of the potential harmful effects of failure to act; consequently, a
197
!98
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The law of omissions is generally defended on grounds of individ
ual autonomy. The argument is that each person is free to pursue his
own ends and projects in life and should be held criminally liable only
if he interferes with another person's doing the same. As a conse
quence, the law prohibits acts but does not require action. My inac
tion cannot harm another, and to require me to act would divert me
from the pursuit of my chosen ends. 202
One would expect the theory of inculpation as a judgment on vir
tue to treat omissions differently. The theory's emphasis on the inter
dependence of human beings and on their inescapable role in defining
the common good suggests that the scope of inculpating duty should
be broader than it is under existing law. That suggestion, however, is
only partly correct.
My theory's emphasis on virtue by no means implies an expansion
of moral or legal duties to act. Unlike conventional morality, virtue is
not a matter of complying with discrete duties. Virtue is a disposition
that leads one to make the correct choice in any given situation, and
to do so as a matter of choice, not compliance. 203
This aspect of virtue ethics suggests a fundamentally different ap
proach to the problem of criminal omissions. Up to now, the emphasis
has been on duty. There is no liability for an omission without a me
diating duty, and the question has been which compelling moral duties
would be recognized as inculpating legal duties as well. An Aristote
lian emphasis on virtue rather than on duty suggests dispensing with
the requirement of a mediating duty altogether. It suggests that one
might be held liable for an omission not because it is a failure to act
where action is required, but because the failure itself evinces a lack of
judgment, an absence of virtue.
This principle may or may not result in an expansion of liability
for omissions, though it would change existing practice. Currently,
when a case of omission is charged and tried, the question of the exist
ence of a duty is for the court. 204 With the elimination of the require
ment of a mediating duty, that particular gatekeeping role would
disappear. The court, however, would retain its general authority over
the sufficiency of the evidence. The question for the jury would be
whether the omission in and of itself was culpable. The jury might
well resort to asking whether a duty to act existed. Just as often, how
ever, they would address directly whether the course the defendant
chose to follow evinced sound judgment; whether they, at their best,
legislative and judicial tenderness to offenses of omission, not always justified by the circum
stances, is still to be found.'}
202 See Andrew Ashworth, The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions, 105 LAW Q. REV.
424, 427-28 (1989).
203 See Frankena, supra note 148, at 152-55.
204 See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 17, § 3.3(a), at 284 n.8.
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would have acted or refrained from acting in his circumstances;
whether, that is, the defendant acted virtuously. The fact that the be
havior in question was an omission would affect the fundamental issue
not at all.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the theory presented above, inculpation is a demand that one
respect, nurture, and employ one's rationality. That is, in the end, not
such a radical theory. What is the criminal law, after all, but an inter
position of rationality into the world of violence that is its province?
The enforcement of the criminal law is viewed uncontroversially as a
demand that disputes be resolved by reason rather than by force. An
Aristotelian account of criminal law simply moves the locus of this
demand for rationality from the legislature to the jury considering the
individual case.
In rejecting a role for theories of distributive justice in inculpation,
this theory supposes that the law frames our ends as well as the means
we use to achieve them. Criminal law as distributive justice supposes
that the parties to the dispute simply have the ends they have, and
that if in the course of adjudication one set of ends is preferred over
another, that is necessary but ultimately arbitrary. The theory of in
culpation presented here rejects that view absolutely. By the institu
tion of inculpation, we require that our ends reflect our status as
rational beings capable of considering our own good in the context of
the good of all. That is both a modest demand and a product of a
richer conception of human life and purposes.

